EPISTEME XXXI 2

Statement of Purpose
Episteme aims to recognize and encourage excellence in undergraduate philosophy. The
journal oﬀers students their ﬁrst opportunity to publish philosophy, and boasts
examples of some of the best work currently being done in undergraduate philosophy
programs around the world. It is our hope that Episteme will help stimulate
philosophical dialogue and inquiry among students and faculty at colleges and
universities.
The Editors consider papers written by undergraduate students in any area of
philosophy. Throughout our history, we have published papers on a wide array of
thinkers and topics, ranging from ancient to contemporary and including analytic,
continental, and eastern. All submissions undergo a process of blind review and are
evaluated according to the following criteria: quality of research, depth of philosophical
inquiry, creativity, original insight, and clarity. Final selections are made by vote of the
Editors and the editorial board.
Please see the Call for Papers at the back of the journal for information on submitting to
our next volume.

Editorial Staﬀ
EDITORS
Paul Bass
Audrey Kirkley
FACULTY ADVISOR
Steven Vogel

EPISTEME XXXI 3

Contents
Statement of Purpose

2

Editorial Staﬀ

2

Contents

3

A Critique of Pure Computation: Against Strong AI and Computationalism
Colin J. Causey, The University of Findlay

4

A Phenomenology of Consumer Goods
Abhinav Bhargava, University of Toronto

29

Carving Out Space for Aristotle’s Megalopsychos
Susanna McGrew, Swarthmore College

41

EPISTEME XXXI 4

EPISTEME XXXI 5

A Critique of Pure Computation: Against Strong AI
and Computationalism
Colin J. Causey, The University of Findlay

Introduction
Can machines think? This question was posed by Alan Turing in his landmark
paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” published in 1950. Turing had in mind
a particular kind of machine, a Turing machine. Modern electronic digital computers are
equivalent to Turing machines, ignoring the constraint of ﬁnite memory. For the
purposes of this paper, we can deﬁne a computer as any machine equivalent to a Turing
machine. Turing’s landmark paper seeded an entire paradigm in the philosophy of
mind that holds that the mind is, essentially, a computer. More precisely, the mind can
be thought of as a software program running on the hardware of the brain, with mental
states being identical to computational states/processes. And, if this is right, then there
is in principle no barrier to creating artiﬁcial minds (1) by way of merely programming
a computer in the appropriate way or (2) by merely bringing about the right sort of
computational processes. At least, this is the hope and belief of many computer
scientists and philosophers of mind today. Turing himself answered his own question in
the aﬃrmative and proposed a test—the Turing Test—for determining whether a
computer could genuinely think and possess mentality.
Although popular views today, I want to argue that (1) and (2) are just plain
wrong. More precisely, (1) can be stated as the thesis of Strong AI.1 Strong AI can be
deﬁned as the following two-part thesis:
“(a) an appropriately programmed computer really would have (or be) a mind in
the same sense that you or I have,
and
(b) its following the program(s) in question would explain its ability to do the
psychological things it does” (Preston & Bishop, 2002, pg. 14).
And, more precisely, (2) can be stated as the thesis of computationalism.
Computationalism is the thesis that mental states are computational processes. As Larry
Hauser puts it: “Computationalism says that computation is what thought is essentially:
(the right) computation is metaphysically necessary for thought…and (right) computation
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metaphysically suﬃces [for thought]” (Hauser, 2002, pp. 124). A computational process can
be deﬁned simply as a process that instantiates or carries out a computation. By
computation, I mean a calculation carried out solely in accordance with an eﬀective method
2
, i.e., any calculation that can be performed by a Turing machine (Copeland, 2017). In
refuting these two theses, I hope to show that pure computation cannot possibly suﬃce
for mind.3 The mind, whatever it is, cannot be purely computational in nature.
Therefore, a computer qua computer cannot have or be a mind.
This last point brings us to the discussion of another important deﬁnition, that of
mind. What is a mind? Well, we can consider a simple deﬁnition as follows: A mind is a
substance or an event or process that manifests things like consciousness, qualia,
thought, and intentionality. Giving a more satisfactory and rigorous deﬁnition of mind
is diﬃcult without taking a stance with regard to a particular form of dualism or
materialism. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, I will simply stipulate that I take
consciousness, intentionality, and qualia to be essential attributes of the mind. If
something fails to have one or more of these attributes, then it is not a mind. I want to
argue that, by way of pure computation alone, these attributes (intentionality in
particular) cannot be generated.
My thesis (stated precisely) is as follows: (1) The thesis that the appropriately
programmed computer, by virtue of running the right program, would literally have or
be a mind in the same sense that you or I have (Strong AI) is false, and (2) The thesis
that mental states are identical to computational states/processes (computationalism) is
similarly false. Pure computation, therefore, can never be suﬃcient for mind.

Against Strong AI
In defense of part (1) of my thesis, I will provide a robust defense of the famous
Chinese Room Argument. As I will argue, the Chinese Room Argument makes a
powerful case against Strong AI. As part of my defense of the argument, I consider four
major objections: the Systems Reply, the Robot Reply, the Brain Simulator Reply, and the
reply from connectionism. As part of my consideration of the Systems Reply, I oﬀer an
original argument as a response.

The Chinese Room Argument
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In 1980, in an article titled “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” the philosopher John
Searle ﬁrst published his famous argument—dubbed the Chinese Room Argument
(CRA)—against both Strong AI and the adequacy of the Turing Test. The CRA consists
of a thought experiment along with a species of arguments based on the scenario. The
CRA can be summarized as follows:
Suppose we have a man named Clerk who is locked inside of a room, the
Chinese Room. Clerk is a monolingual English speaker. Inside the Room is Clerk,
a pencil, many sheets of paper, and a rulebook. The Room is closed oﬀ to the
outside except for a small slit at the bottom of the door leading into the Room.
On the outside of the door is a native Chinese speaker. The native Chinese
speaker slips numerous sheets of paper with Chinese symbols on them through
the slit at the bottom of the door. What’s written on some of these sheets is a
story written in Chinese. What’s written on the remaining sheets are questions
about the story (also written in Chinese). Clerk, on the inside, receives these
sheets and consults his rulebook to see what to do with the information on them.
The rulebook is written in English and contains instructions for how to correlate
one set of Chinese symbols with another set of Chinese symbols. Clerk then
follows the rules of the rulebook and (using his pencil) writes down Chinese
symbols on the blank sheets of paper he has with him in the Room. Once
ﬁnished, Clerk slips these sheets of paper (containing Chinese symbols) through
the slit at the bottom of the door. Then, on the outside, the native Chinese
speaker picks up the sheets of paper and reads them. And he is fully convinced
that the man in the Room (Clerk) understands Chinese. In particular, he thinks
that Clerk understood the Chinese story and provided perfectly reasonable
answers to the questions posed about the story. However, Clerk in fact doesn’t
understand Chinese at all. To him, the Chinese characters he received as input
and produced as output were just meaningless symbols (Preston & Bishop, 2002,
pg. 18).
In Searle’s own words (as presented by B. Jack Copeland):
“[Clerk] do[es] not understand a word of the Chinese stories. [Clerk] ha[s] inputs
and outputs that are indistinguishable from the native Chinese speaker, and
[Clerk] can have any formal program you like, but [Clerk] still understand[s]
nothing. [A] computer4 for the same reasons understands nothing of any
stories…[W]hatever purely formal principles you put into the computer will not
be suﬃcient for understanding, since a human will be able to follow the formal
principles without understanding…” (Copeland, 2002, pp. 110). Note that
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“Clerk” has been inserted into Searle’s words. Originally, Searle placed himself in
the scenario.
Unfortunately, Searle does not give a precise deﬁnition of understanding. Thus,
in the interest of rendering the CRA a bit more rigorous, I propose the following
deﬁnition: Understanding is the cognitive faculty by which, or the mental state in which,
one comes to know or knows the meaning or meanings of things. From this deﬁnition,
we can say that x understands y just in case x knows the meaning or meanings of y.
Symbolically,
(∀x)( ∀y)(Uxy ≡ (∀z)(Mzy ⊃ Kxz)), where U = understands,M = is a meaning
of, and K = knows. Regarding knowledge, I will simply adopt the justiﬁed true belief
deﬁnition.
To summarize, the CRA illustrates the following: A computer merely implements
purely syntactical rules. And syntax, as Searle is fond of saying, is not suﬃcient for
semantics. This is a core principle in Searle’s philosophy. Given this, the computer
therefore has no way of attaching meanings to the symbols it processes. Thus, as
illustrated in the Chinese Room, the computer cannot attach meanings to the symbols
making up the Chinese story it receives as input. Thus, under the proposed deﬁnition of
understanding, the computer does not understand the Chinese story, even though it
passes the Turing Test for doing so. And since understanding (and intentional states in
general) is a fundamental faculty of the mind (minds like ours at least), it follows that
an appropriately programmed computer, by virtue of running a program, cannot have
or be a mind. But then tenet (a) of the Strong AI thesis is false, entailing the falsehood of
Strong AI. This establishes part (1) of my thesis. Furthermore, the Turing Test, as a
decisive test of genuine intelligence, is inadequate. This is the basic thrust of the CRA
and its various incarnations.
A brutally simple argument following from the above reasoning and the Chinese Room
scenario—oddly enough dubbed the “Brutally Simple Argument”—can be formulated
as follows:
1.

Programs are purely formal (syntactical).

2.
Minds (human ones, at least) have semantics, mental (i.e. semantic)
contents.
3.

Syntax by itself is neither the same as, nor suﬃcient for, semantic content.

4.
Therefore, programs by themselves are not constitutive of nor suﬃcient
for minds (Preston & Bishop, 2002, pg. 28).
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Searle takes the Chinese Room scenario to illustrate the truth of the third premise. What
Clerk is doing in the Chinese Room is, as Searle would say, “purely syntactical.” He is
merely following a set of formal rules. And though Clerk passes the Turing Test for
understanding Chinese, Clerk does not in fact understand Chinese, at least not by virtue
of running the purely syntactical program. Therefore, the thought experiment illustrates
the aforementioned core principle that syntax is not suﬃcient for semantics.
A quick objection should be addressed ﬁrst before getting to the more interesting
objections. An objector might very well say something along the following lines: “Wait a
minute, Searle. The Chinese Room does not illustrate that syntax is by itself insuﬃcient
for semantics. All it shows is that the particular syntax of the particular program Clerk is
running is insuﬃcient for semantics. The reason Clerk doesn’t understand Chinese is
that he must just be running the wrong program.”
What should we make of this objection? By my estimation, not much. Clearly, we
could give any Chinese understanding program we like to Clerk (assuming it’s
Turing-computable) to execute and the results of the thought experiment would be the
same. Recall in the above exposition of the scenario, Searle states: “[Clerk] can have any
formal program you like…” (emphasis added). The objection that Clerk must be
running the wrong program, therefore, holds no water.

Systems Reply
Perhaps the chief objection to the CRA is that all it is capable of showing is that
Clerk— who is but a part of the Chinese Room—cannot understand Chinese by virtue
of running the program. But maybe it is the Room as a whole that understands Chinese.
Clerk is really analogous to the CPU, and the Room as a whole is analogous to the
computer. And from the fact that the CPU doesn’t understand Chinese, it doesn’t follow
that the computer as a system does not understand Chinese. Remember, the contention
of Strong AI is that an appropriately programmed computer would have or be a mind. It
does not contend that an appropriately programmed CPU would have or be a mind.
Thus, the CRA fails to refute Strong AI. This objection is defended, for instance, by Ned
Block (2002) in his article “Searle’s Arguments against Cognitive Science.”
Searle’s response to this point is to tweak the scenario in the following way:
Imagine that Clerk internalizes everything in the Room. He memorizes the rulebook
and runs through the logic of the program in his head, keeping track of everything
mentally without using a pencil and paper. Clerk, in this scenario, has now become the
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Room. There is now nothing in the Room in the original scenario that is not inside him.
The rest of the scenario then proceeds as usual. Clerk runs through the program, passes
the Turing Test for understanding Chinese, and yet does not understand Chinese. And
since Clerk now comprises the entire room, since he does not understand Chinese, the
Room also does not understand Chinese. The Systems Reply, so says Searle, therefore
fails.
With Searle’s response to the Systems Reply, however, comes another objection,
what might be called the Subsystems Reply. While it may now be true that the Room
does not understand Chinese, it doesn’t follow that therefore no part of the Room
understands Chinese. In computer terminology, just because the computer as a whole
does not understand Chinese, it doesn’t follow therefore that no subsystem in the
computer understands Chinese. The claim is that Searle moves from committing the
fallacy of composition to committing the fallacy of division.
B. Jack Copeland is a proponent of this line of attack against the CRA. Regarding
the standard (what Copeland calls the vanilla) CRA, Copeland argues that the argument
is not logically valid. As Copeland states: “The proposition that the formal symbol
manipulation carried out by Clerk does not enable Clerk to understand the Chinese
story by no means entails the quite diﬀerent proposition that the formal symbol
manipulation carried out by Clerk does not enable the Room to understand the Chinese
story” (Copeland, 2002, pp. 110).
This is a form of the Systems Reply, though Copeland wants to distance the
objection from that label. Instead, Copeland calls his objection the “logical reply.” Still, it
can be considered to be of the same species as the Systems Reply, as the claim is still that
the CRA fails to show that the Room as a whole lacks understanding and other
intentional states.
Copeland formulates a revised CRA based on Searle’s Systems Reply rebuttal as
follows:
1.

The system is part of Clerk.

2.
If Clerk (in general, x) does not understand the Chinese story (in general,
does not ϕ), then no part of Clerk (x) understands the Chinese story (ϕs).
3.
The formal symbol manipulation carried out by Clerk does not enable
Clerk to understand the Chinese story.
4.
Therefore, the formal symbol manipulation carried out by Clerk does not
enable the system to understand the Chinese story (Copeland, 2002, pp. 111).
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In responding to this new argument, Copeland takes Searle to task by pressing his
version of the Subsystems Reply, setting his sights especially on the second premise.
Copeland writes: “It is all too conceivable that a homunculus or homuncular system in
Clerk’s head should be able to understand Chinese without Clerk being able to do so”
(Copeland, 2002, pp. 112). Edward Feser adds: “But maybe…[Clerk’s] conscious
understanding of English might be identical to his running a certain program (the
program for English competence), while at the same time, by virtue of his following the
rules of the rulebook and implementing the program for Chinese understanding, there
is a second stream of consciousness that is consciously aware of speaking and
understanding Chinese, even if the English-speaking program isn’t” (Feser, 2005, pg.
124). Ned Block argues similarly (Block, 2002, pp. 74). This second stream of
consciousness, per Copeland, can be conceptualized as a homunculus or homuncular
system in Clerk’s head running a subprogram as part of the overall program Clerk is
running. What Searle must do, therefore, is show that this possibility isn’t actual.
Otherwise, we have no grounds for thinking that premise 2 is true.
Matryoshka Homunculi Argument
In response to Copeland’s Subsystems Reply, I propose the following response,
what I call the Matryoshka Homunculi Argument (inspired by Daniel Dennett’s idea of
homuncular decomposition5). We can apply homuncular decomposition to Clerk as
follows: Let hi denote a homunculus. Then, there is a set {h1, …, hn} of homunculi inside
Clerk, for some positive integer n. Then, for each homunculus in this set, there is a set of
homunculi contained within it. Then, for each homunculus in this set, there is a set of
homunculi contained within it, and so on until we reach a basic level of homunculi that
cannot be broken down any further. Figure 1 below provides a visual diagram of
homuncular decomposition for three levels of decomposition. The strategy, of course,
extends to any arbitrary number of levels.

Figure 1: Tree diagram of homuncular decomposition for three levels
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Now, we can apply the CRA to this scenario as follows: In response to the
Systems Reply, we can, per Searle, suppose that Clerk internalizes the Room, such that
he now comprises the Room. And since he does not understand Chinese by virtue of
running a computer program, neither does the Room. But, per Copeland, perhaps a
homunculus or homuncular system (a subsystem) inside Clerk does understand
Chinese by virtue of running a computer program (a subprogram of the overall
program Clerk is running). But we can now apply the CRA to this homunculus or
homuncular system. Using our diagram as a visual, we can consider the ﬁrst level of
homunculi inside Clerk, Level 1. Level 1 contains a set of homunculi {h1, …, hn}. Now,
we know that the set as a whole does not understand Chinese because Clerk comprises
this whole system, and we have shown that he does not understand Chinese. We can
then show that none of the individual homunculi understand Chinese by applying the
CRA to each homunculus in the set. The result is that an individual homunculus, h i,
does not understand Chinese for the same reason Clerk does not in the original Chinese
Room.
But, Copeland might say, perhaps there is a subsystem, i.e., another homunculus
or homuncular system in one or more of these Level 1 homunculi that understands
Chinese by virtue of running a computer program. Now we are at Level 2. And for any
homunculus in Level 2, we can apply the CRA to it and show that it cannot understand
Chinese by virtue of running a computer program. For instance, we can take all the
Level 2 homunculi contained within h1 from Level 1 and show that none of them
understands Chinese. But here one might object with the Systems Reply all over again.
Perhaps the system of homunculi contained within, for instance, h1 from Level 1
understands Chinese, even though none of the individual homunculi in the system do.
But we have in fact already shown that this is not the case. h1 from Level 1 comprises
this whole system. And we have already shown that it does not understand Chinese.
Thus, neither the system (h1) nor the individual homunculi in the system understand
Chinese by virtue of running a computer program.
This same reasoning can be carried out for the rest of the homunculi in Level 2.
We can then continue on with this strategy for Level 3, and so on for however many
levels Clerk happens to have. And once we reach the last, most basic level of homunculi
and show (via this same strategy) that no understanding of Chinese by virtue of
running a computer program can be generated in this level, we will have reached a
terminus at which Copeland would be unable to appeal to some further homunculus or
homuncular system that could possibly understand Chinese.
We can summarize this strategy by conceptualizing the homunculi (or “little
Clerks” if we’re feeling aﬀectionate) inside Clerk as a collection of multiple sets of
Russian matryoshka dolls (depicted in Figure 2 below). The dolls in Level 1 (the largest
dolls) contain the dolls in Level 2, which in turn contain the dolls in Level 3, and so on.
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The dolls in the most basic level are the smallest and do not themselves contain any
dolls. The CRA is then applied to each of these dolls.

Figure 2: A set of Russian matryoshka dolls

What this argument shows is that Clerk does not understand Chinese (and so, a
fortiori, neither does the Room), and no subsystem within Clerk understands Chinese,
by virtue of running a computer program. Thus, Copeland’s objection fails, and the
CRA stands.
One objection to this argument would be to say that maybe there is an inﬁnite
chain of homunculi. Thus, we never actually reach a terminus and Copeland can
continue appealing to further homunculi ad inﬁnitum. This, however, is a nonstarter. For
if we suppose that Clerk’s intentionality is to be explained in terms of h1’s intentionality,
and h1’s intentionality is to be explained in terms of h2’s intentionality, and so on ad
inﬁnitum, then we never really get to any bedrock explanation, leaving Clerk’s
intentionality ultimately unexplained and ontologically ungrounded.

Robot Reply
Another reply to the CRA is that the reason Clerk lacks understanding is because
he lacks contact with the outside world. What’s needed is a way to sense things and
react to stimuli, creating the right sort of causal relations between the symbols in the
program and the things they refer to. The contention is, therefore, that an appropriately
programmed robot (with sensors) would have a mind by virtue of running a computer
program (Preston & Bishop, 2002, pg. 31). This is the Robot Reply. Searle’s response to
the Robot Reply is to modify the scenario by putting sensors on the outside of the room.
These sensors can then scan the outside world and have causal interaction with it. But
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Clerk only has access to the output of the sensors, which consists merely of more
symbols for him to manipulate. Thus, Clerk still, by virtue of running the program, has
no way of attaching meaning to these symbols. Therefore, Clerk still does not have
understanding and other intentional states by running the program. The Robot Reply,
so says Searle, thus fails.
However, the Systems Reply can then be pressed against Searle (thus combining
the Systems Reply and the Robot Reply). Clerk in this revised scenario is really just a
homunculus in the robot’s head, implementing but a part of the robot. He isn’t
implementing the whole system. In particular, he isn’t implementing the operation of
the sensors. Perhaps the whole robot has understanding and other intentional states,
despite the fact that Clerk, who is but a part of the robot, does not (Bringsjord & Noel,
2002, pp. 150-151). But Searle can respond to this objection by deploying a strategy quite
similar to the one he deploys against the typical Systems Reply.6
As a ﬁnal note, it should be said that the Robot Reply in fact tacitly concedes the
point that computation alone is not enough for mental states (intentionality in
particular); rather, what’s needed is computation plus causal interaction with the
environment. Thus, even if the Robot Reply should be found persuasive, it really
doesn’t cut against my thesis anyway.

Brain Simulator Reply
Yet another reply to the CRA (by now, I suspect you are getting the impression
that this is a widely discussed argument) is the Brain Simulator Reply, which can be
stated as follows:
“Suppose…[the program] simulates the actual sequence of neuron ﬁrings at the
synapses [in] the brain of a native Chinese speaker when he understands stories
in Chinese and gives answers to them…[S]urely in such a case we would have to
say that the machine understood the stories; and if we refuse to say that,
wouldn’t we also have to deny that native Chinese speakers understood the
stories?” (Winograd, 2002, pp. 87).
Searle responds to this by appealing to the principle that simulation is not duplication
(Searle, 2002, pp. 52). We can deﬁne simulation as follows: x simulates y just in case x
replicates enough properties of y such that x can be considered to be equivalent to y in a
certain context. We can deﬁne duplication as: x duplicates y just in case x replicates every
property of y.7 Under these deﬁnitions, simulation and duplication are not necessarily
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mutually exclusive categories; nevertheless (importantly), duplication is not entailed by
simulation.
The justiﬁcation for the principle is, in my view, quite strong. In defending the
principle, Searle asks us to imagine a computer simulation of digestion, pointing out
that it would be absurd to suggest that such a simulation could actually digest things
like beer or pizza. Searle writes, “You can simulate the cognitive processes of the human
mind as you can simulate rain storms, ﬁve alarm ﬁres, digestion, or anything else that
you can describe precisely. But it is just as ridiculous to think that a system that had a
simulation of consciousness and other mental processes thereby had the mental
processes, as it would be to think that the simulation of digestion on a computer could
thereby actually digest beer and pizza” (Searle, 2002, pp. 52). Given such powerful
counterexamples to its falsehood, Searle’s principle is highly plausible, providing a
powerful reason to reject the Brain Simulator Reply. The fact that we can simulate neural
processes with computation does not entail that we can duplicate neural processes with
computation.

Connectionist Objections and the Chinese Gym
A ﬁnal (and formidable) objection I will consider comes from proponents of
connectionism, the idea that the mind is a large neural network with many nodes
simultaneously interacting with each other as a parallel system. The objection is that the
CRA targets a serial computer. Parallel computation performed by a collection of
computers (forming computational neural networks), therefore, avoids the CRA. Searle
has two responses to this. The ﬁrst is to argue that parallel computations can be
simulated serially. More technically, any ﬁnite collection of Turing machines can be
simulated by a single universal Turing machine. And, therefore, the original CRA can be
pressed against connectionism with the proviso that Clerk can simulate parallel
computation by running a parallel program serially in the appropriate way.
Our friend Copeland, however, argues that this response to connectionism fails. To do
so, Copeland uses Searle’s core principle at work against the Brain Simulator Reply (as
stated above): simulation is not duplication. To think that simulation is duplication would
be to commit what Copeland calls the simulation fallacy. He states it formally as follows:
“x is a simulation of y; y has property ϕ, therefore x has property ϕ” (Copeland, 2002,
pp. 115). Thus, from the fact that Clerk is simulating parallel computations, it does not
follow that he is therefore duplicating parallel computations. The CRA is therefore
powerless against connectionism. And (I would add) if Searle, upon hearing this
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objection, decides to abandon his own principle, then the Brain Simulator Reply can be
pressed against him. We can formulate this reasoning in the form of a constructive
dilemma as follows:
1.

Either the principle that simulation is not duplication is true or it is false.

2.
If the principle that simulation is not duplication is true, then the CRA
fails (defeated by connectionism).
3.
If the principle that simulation is not duplication is false, then the CRA
fails (defeated by the Brain Simulator Reply).
4.

Therefore, the CRA fails.

In my view, this objection is very plausible (under the assumption that the brain is
suﬃcient for mind). At the very least, the objection shows that the CRA is inconclusive
with regard to connectionism.
So, is connectionism victorious? Not quite. Recall that I mentioned Searle has two
responses. The second response is to construct a new scenario, the Chinese Gym. Searle
describes the Chinese Gym scenario as follows:
“Imagine that instead of a Chinese room, I have a Chinese gym: a hall containing
many monolingual English-speaking men. These men would carry out the same
operations as the nodes and synapses in a connectionist architecture…and the
outcome would be the same as having one man manipulate symbols according
to a rule book. No one in the gym speaks a word of Chinese…Yet with
appropriate adjustments, the system could give the correct answers to Chinese
questions” (Copeland, 2002, pp. 116).
Copeland’s reply to this is that another kind of Systems Reply can be mounted against
the Chinese Gym. Just because none of the individuals in the Gym understand Chinese,
it doesn’t follow that therefore the Gym as a whole does not understand Chinese.
Copeland writes, “The fallacy involved in moving from part to whole is even more
glaring than in the original version of the Chinese Room Argument” (Copeland, 2002,
pp. 116). In response to this objection, Searle could deploy a strategy similar to the one
deployed in his response to the Systems Reply to the original Chinese Room. We can
suppose that Clerk internalizes the Gym such that he now comprises the entire
connectionist network. Now, questions from a Chinese speaker are posed to Clerk who
then…what? If we say that Clerk simply “submits” the input to the Gym inside him and
then receives the output, it is certainly true that Clerk does not understand Chinese. But
to say that this shows that the Gym doesn’t understand Chinese would be to beg the
question. In fact, this reply is really just a facade. All we’ve done, essentially, is to take
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the connectionist network, throw it inside a box, argue that the box doesn’t understand
Chinese, and then conclude that the connectionist network therefore doesn’t understand
Chinese.
If instead we say that Clerk is actively running through the parallel program that
would have otherwise been instantiated in the connectionist network, then what Clerk
is really doing (given that he is acting as a serial computer) is merely simulating the
connectionist network, thus opening the way for our constructive dilemma. Thus, this
line of argument won’t work. Although I’m unwilling to say that the connectionist is
ultimately victorious, I must tentatively conclude that the CRA is inconclusive against
connectionism. However, there are other (arguably) more fundamental arguments that
will be explored in the section on computationalism that strike forcefully against
connectionism. And it is to that section that I shall now turn.

Against Computationalism
In defense of part (2) of my thesis, I will turn my attention to a refutation of
computationalism. In many ways, the arguments presented here cut a wider swath than
the CRA is capable of on its own. We’ve seen, for instance, that the CRA is (arguably)
inconclusive against connectionism. First, it is worth pointing out how Strong AI and
computationalism diﬀer. It is, for instance, possible to adhere to one and not the other.
For example, saying that an appropriately programmed computer would have or be a
mind does not commit one to also saying that mental states are identical to
computational processes. Strong AI does entail that computation is suﬃcient for mental
states, but it is not committed to saying that mental states are identical to computational
states. Computationalism also sets out to be a more full-bodied position than Strong AI
(as deﬁned in this paper). For instance, computationalism insists that the right causal
relationships between computational states and the right (computational) processes
must be generated in order to guarantee mental content. As we’ll see, this is a key point
made by computationalists. Programs alone are not enough. Processes are what is
essential. In this way, computationalism tries to take causal powers more seriously than
Strong AI, tries being the operative word.

Processes over Programs
In response to the Chinese Room, computationalists object and argue that the
problem with the dialectic is that it conceptualizes the mind as a black box with only
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inputs and outputs being relevant. But the mind, according to computationalists, is not
a black box. Rather, what’s essential to the mind is what goes on in between inputs and
outputs—the internal processes. For instance, Georges Rey argues that the Chinese
Room attacks a behavioristic strawman. In contrast to the defunct position of
behaviorism, Rey argues that computationalism (he refers to this as a version of Strong
AI in his article) is a species of functionalism, the dominant position in the philosophy
of mind today, and that Searle misunderstands the functionalist project.
Computationalism, so says Rey, takes processes and not merely behavior seriously,
unlike the CRA. He further adds that the computationalist needn’t be at all committed
to the Turing Test (Rey, 2002, pp. 201-206). The charge is that the CRA therefore fails to
refute computationalism.
A similar computationalist objection to the CRA (speciﬁcally, the Brutally Simple
Argument) comes from the aforementioned Larry Hauser. Hauser challenges the ﬁrst
premise on the grounds that “although programs are purely syntactic, the processes in
which they run are not” (Preston & Bishop, 2002, pg. 36). Running programs have
causal and dynamic properties that “static” programs do not. Hauser concludes that the
Brutally Simple Argument therefore misses the point, at least as far as
computationalism is concerned. So what if static programs are purely syntactical?
Dynamic programs are not (Hauser, 2002, pp. 126). The premise is, therefore, ambiguous.
Does it refer to static programs or dynamic programs? If it refers to static programs,
then (Hauser would concede) the premise is true, but it is irrelevant to the claims of
computationalism. If instead it refers to dynamic (running) programs, then (says
Hauser) the premise is false. Either way, the argument fails to refute computationalism.
I have two responses to this objection. The ﬁrst response is to defend the Brutally
Simple Argument against Hauser. While it may be true that the processes in which
programs run are not purely syntactical, nevertheless the aspect of those processes by
virtue of which they are instantiating a program (by virtue of which they are
computational processes) is purely syntactical.8 The processes instantiating the program
do so by following the rules of the program. And those rules are purely syntactical. If
Hauser wants to say that it is really the physical processes and not the formal
rule-following qua rule-following that is constitutive of mind, then the program itself
would seem to be superﬂuous, for it is all too conceivable that the same physical
processes could be present without any program present that the processes would
otherwise be instantiating.9
And if it is the physical processes that are supposed to be suﬃcient for semantics
and for mind, then the program and computations themselves would seem to be
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causally ineﬃcacious, so why bother positing them as being signiﬁcant to the mind in
the ﬁrst place? By my lights, the theory is explanatorily bankrupt and in need of a shave
from Occam’s razor. But then, part (b) of the Strong AI thesis is false, in addition to part
(a). The appropriately programmed computer (qua programmed computer) cannot
really have or be a mind, and its following the program in question would not explain
its ability to do the psychological things it does. We thus have additional support for
part (1) of my thesis. Furthermore, since the argument shows also that computation qua
computation is not suﬃcient for mind, computationalism is similarly shown to be false,
thus proving part (2) of my thesis.
Another response is to accept the basic thrust of Hauser’s objection and abandon
the Brutally Simple Argument in favor of another argument based on the Chinese Room
scenario. The Chinese Room scenario is in fact a description of a running program, not
merely a static program. Clerk is instantiating the program, giving it the causal and
dynamic properties that Hauser has in mind in his objection. And still, Clerk does not
understand Chinese by virtue of these causal and dynamic properties exhibited by the
processes in which the program is executed. But then, the Chinese Room scenario
shows that running programs are not suﬃcient for semantic content any more than
static programs are. The argument can be formalized as follows:
1.

Minds have understanding and other intentional states.

2.
Instantiating a computer program (computational processing) is never by
itself a suﬃcient condition for understanding and other intentional states.
3.
Therefore, instantiating a computer program (computational processing)
is never by itself a suﬃcient condition for minds.
The Chinese Room scenario, in this case, can be used to support premise 2. Hauser
notes that the argument no longer makes reference to the syntax-semantics distinction,
but so what? The soundness of the argument doesn’t have anything to do with whether
it makes reference to the syntax-semantics distinction.
Hauser, however, has another arrow in his quiver. Premise 2 of this new argument is far
less obvious than premise 3 of the Brutally Simple Argument. Nevertheless, our claim is
that the Chinese Room thought experiment provides support for premise 2 of this new
argument just as it provides support for premise 3 of the Brutally Simple Argument.
However, premise 3 of the Brutally Simple Argument (Syntax by itself is neither the
same as, nor suﬃcient for, semantic content) is a conceptual, logical truth, the kind of
truth that can be established by a thought experiment like the Chinese Room. Premise 2
of the new argument, however, is not a mere logical truth (not obviously so, anyway).
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Thus, the Chinese Room experiment, says Hauser, “must bear some empirical weight;
and here, it’s the experiment that doesn’t suﬃce” (Hauser, 2002, pp. 127). Hauser argues
that the Chinese Room is but a single experiment and its results are contrary to those of
other “real” experiments. Hauser argues that it is evidently the case, for instance, that
computers are capable of doing such things as seeking, comparing, and deciding. And
these activities are indicative of mentality and thought. Moreover, computers are
evidently capable of following rules and carrying out instructions, a further indication
that computers are capable of mental activities. Computational processing, Hauser
concludes, therefore does seem to suﬃce for mind (Hauser, 2002, pp. 129, 141).
How a Computer “Computes”
In response to Hauser, I want to argue that the idea that computers literally
follow rules and carry out instructions is mistaken. At the very least, the suggestion
carries little force once we take into account how an electronic digital computer really
works at the hardware level. The primary component of a computer, of course, is the
central processing unit (CPU). Within the CPU are two major components: the control
unit and the arithmetic logic unit (ALU). To simplify the discussion, I’ll focus on the
ALU. The ALU is responsible for performing arithmetic and logic operations such as
addition, logical AND, and so forth. Let’s consider a very simple 1-bit ALU as depicted
below:
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Figure 3: A 1-bit ALU, taken from (Tanenbaum & Austin, 2013, pg. 167)

This particular ALU performs four diﬀerent operations: addition, logical AND,
logical OR, and logical NOT. For any particular processing cycle, one operation is
“selected” and “carried out” or “executed” on the “inputs” and the resulting “output”
is transmitted outside of the ALU. I put these terms in scare quotes because I want to
argue that the ALU does not literally or intrinsically do these things. Physically, the
inputs, instructions, and outputs are nothing more than electrical signals being sent
through the circuitry of the ALU. The inputs in the diagram are A and B. The
instructions are encoded by F0 and F1. To simplify, we’ll ignore INVA, ENA, and ENB, as
their consideration is irrelevant to the argument. Now, the electrical signals running
through the circuitry are either high voltage or low voltage (the speciﬁc numerical
measure isn’t important). Bits in a computer are represented by these signals and their
voltages. For instance, it is common for a high voltage to correspond to a 1 and a low
voltage to correspond to a 0. Thus, every bit has two possible states (hence, the name
binary or digital computer).
The operation the ALU is to perform in any given cycle depends on the states of
F0 and F1. Given that we have two variables, with each having two possible states, there
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are a total of 22 = 4 possible combinations of states (00, 01, 10, and 11). These four
combinations correspond to the four operations the ALU can perform. For example, (F 0,
F1) = (0, 0) corresponds to logical AND, (F 0, F1) = (0, 1) corresponds to logical OR, and so
forth.
With the conceptual machinery in place, let’s run through an operation
performed by this ALU. Suppose we have a high voltage transmitted down the A line
and a low voltage transmitted down the B line. Furthermore, let’s suppose we have a
high voltage running down the F0 line and a high voltage running down the F1 line.
Then, the circuitry (whose details we have ignored for simpliﬁcation purposes) causes
the electrical signals being transmitted to behave in such a way that the voltage on the
Output line is high. Now, recall that we’ve decided to treat a high voltage as being
representative of a 1 and a low voltage as a 0. Our F0 and F1, therefore, both correspond
to 1, resulting in the “selection” of the addition operation. A then corresponds to 1, and
B corresponds to 0. The Output, then, being a high voltage, corresponds to 1, which
corresponds to the sum of 1 + 0.
Thus, our ALU has behaved as-if it had performed addition. But, literally and
intrinsically, all that physically happened was the transmission of electrical signals
through circuitry. That these electrical processes running through silicon performed
addition is true only so far as we have taken them to have done so. That is to say, it is we
who interpret these signals as having mathematical signiﬁcance. The argument, then, is
that a computer has at best as-if intentionality (and other mental states) and not intrinsic
intentionality (and other mental states). It does not, contrary to Hauser, literally seek,
compare, and decide things nor does it literally follow rules and carry out instructions.
Rather, it merely behaves in accordance with rules that we describe. It is rather
analogous to the way in which a falling rock “follows” the law of gravity. Hauser’s
empirical weight, therefore, is as light as a feather.
An objection that might now be raised is as follows: All right, so the computer
does not literally follow rules. But the processes are, as you admit, behaving in
accordance with the rules of the program. And if something is behaving in accordance
with the rules of a program, then it is in fact instantiating that program. That’s just what
it is to instantiate a program.
My reply is that this suggestion is actually very damaging to the
computationalist cause. If anything that behaves in accordance with the rules of a
program is instantiating that program, then the whole notion of instantiating a program
becomes utterly trivial and explanatorily inept with regard to the mind. For this would
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entail that nearly (and possibly) everything is instantiating an inﬁnity of programs.
Indeed, it can be argued that nearly everything instantiates every program and thus, a
fortiori, instantiates mind programs, leaving us with an absurd panpsychism (assuming
we are computationalists). This trivialization point carries with it, I think, a tremendous
amount of force against both Strong AI and computationalism and goes even deeper
than the Chinese Room Argument, and it is what I shall now turn to.
Trivialization Argument
In addition to his Chinese Room Argument, Searle has also given an argument
that what counts as a computer is up to us, and that something only counts as a
computer in the ﬁrst place if we say so. Computation is, therefore, a mind-dependent,
observer-relative phenomenon (Searle, 2002, pp. 67). This point is exempliﬁed by my
above argument involving the ALU. The ALU “performs” addition only relative to our
saying so, relative to us interpreting its physical states as having mathematical
signiﬁcance. Searle then uses this idea to draw the conclusion that the concept of a
computer is entirely trivial. Almost anything could count as a computer running a
program. This follows because we can interpret physical states as computational states.
This is in fact what we do with electronic digital computers, as explained above with
the ALU. We interpret electrical voltages as having mathematical signiﬁcance, as being
constitutive of bits. But there isn’t anything special about electricity here. Computation
can be realized in other things as well. It is, as functionalists like to say, multiply
realizable. What I want to argue is that computation is not merely multiply realizable,
but universally realizable.
If this trivialization point is correct, then computationalism would seem to
crumble. As John Preston writes, “If almost any process can count as almost any
computation, then the computationalist view of cognition, instead of being the
interesting (and empirical) hypothesis its advocates intend, is vacuous” (Preston &
Bishop, 2002, pg. 43). Hilary Putnam and Mark Bishop provide, I think, a compelling
case for this very proposition.
In the appendix of his book Representation and Reality, Putnam lays out an
argument that every open physical system is every ﬁnite state automaton (FSA). In
Putnam’s own words, “Every ordinary open system is a realization of every abstract
ﬁnite automaton” (Putnam, 1988, pg. 121). Bishop, in his article “Dancing with Pixies:
Strong Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Panpsychism,” provides a robust defense of a more
modest version of this argument. Bishop argues that “over a ﬁnite time window, every
open system implements the trace of a particular FSA Q, as it executes program (p) on
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input (x)” (Bishop, 2002, pp. 361). And if the computational states Q goes through are
suﬃcient for mental states and phenomenal experience, this entails, since every open
physical system implements a trace of Q, every open physical system has mental states
and phenomenal experience. Thus, computationalism, if it is true, entails panpsychism,
an absurd result. We thus have an informal reductio ad absurdum argument against
computationalism.
The argument goes like this: The operations of a Turing machine, taken over a
ﬁnite time interval, can be replicated by an FSA. This is true because, over a ﬁnite time
interval, a Turing machine transits a ﬁnite number of computational states. Thus, any
given trace of a program executed by a Turing machine over a ﬁnite time interval can be
implemented with an FSA even though, in general, Turing machines are
computationally more powerful than FSAs. Thus, an FSA can be said to be equivalent to
a Turing machine over a ﬁnite period of time in the sense that an FSA can replicate the
same computational states as a Turing machine over the ﬁnite time interval in question.
Therefore, if we have a Turing machine executing a program and instantiating
computations that are hypothesized to be suﬃcient for mind over a ﬁnite time interval,
an FSA, by instantiating those same computations over the interval in question, would
also be suﬃcient for mind.
With all this in mind, Bishop asks us to consider an FSA Q with states [A] and [B]
that, over a ﬁnite time interval [t1…t6], goes through the sequence of states <A B A B A
B>. Next, we can consider any open physical system S. Over a ﬁnite time interval, say
[t1…t6], S will go through physical states [s1…s6]. We can then map Q’s computational
states onto S’s physical states such that [A] corresponds to the disjunction of [s1 v s3 v s5]
and [B] corresponds to the disjunction of [s2 v s4 v s6]. With this mapping in place, as S
transits through its physical states over the time interval in question, it will completely
implement Q and its state transitions.10 And since it is clear that this same procedure
could be carried out for any FSA and open physical system having any (ﬁnite) number
of states and going through any particular state transitions over a ﬁnite time interval,
we may conclude that every open physical system implements the trace of any ﬁnite
state automaton executing a program with a deﬁned input over a ﬁnite time interval.
And since an FSA is capable of instantiating a trace of any Turing-computable
program over a ﬁnite time interval, we can conclude that every open physical system
implements a trace of any Turing-computable program over a ﬁnite time interval. Now,
if we assume that Strong AI and computationalism are true, then, by running the right
program and instantiating the right computation, a mind emerges. And since every
open physical system implements a trace of any Turing-computable program over a
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ﬁnite time interval, a fortiori, every open physical system implements a trace of any
Turing-computable Strong AI program. Hence, we are left with the absurd conclusion
that every open physical system is suﬀused with mind. Given this absurdity, it must be
that our original assumption is false. That is, it must be that Strong AI and
computationalism are false. Reductio argument concluded.
Perhaps the chief objection to this argument is that S does not properly
implement Q because it lacks the ability to support what we might call counterfactuals of
computation. These are counterfactuals about what computation a computer would
perform were it in a particular machine state and given a particular input. Ned Block is
a proponent of this objection. Although Block refers speciﬁcally to a wall, his objection
can be generalized to any open physical system. It should also be noted that, in his
example, Block is referring to a simple 1-bit addition program. Block writes, “In order
for a wall to be [a] computer [performing addition], it isn’t enough for it to have states
that correspond to ‘0’ and ‘1’ followed by a state that corresponds to ‘1’. It must also be
such that had the ‘1’ input been replaced by a ‘0’ input, the ‘1’ output would have been
replaced by the ‘0’ output. In other words, it has to have symbolic states that satisfy not
only the actual computation, but also the possible computations that the computer could
have performed. And this is non-trivial” (Block, 2002, pp. 77).
In order to provide more clarity to both the trivialization argument and Block’s
objection to it, we can consider the following diagram of an FSA:
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Figure 4: State transition diagram of a ﬁnite state automaton, based on (Block, 2002,
pp. 77)

This is a state transition diagram of a ﬁnite state automaton that performs 1-bit addition
without carry. Its behavior, like every ﬁnite state automaton, is fully determined by its
current state and input. In this case, the initial state is [A] and the ﬁnal state is either [D]
or [E]. The set of inputs i is the set {i1, i2}. The set of outputs o is the set {o}. If, for
example, we have i = {1, 0}, then the FSA goes through the sequence of states <A C E>
and the output is o = {1}. By transiting through these states, our FSA has thereby
calculated 1 + 0. Now, what has been shown in the preceding argument is that every
open physical system implements a trace of every ﬁnite state automaton. For instance,
the sequence of states <A C E> is such a trace. Thus, if we know the inputs for a given
trace—in this case i = {1, 0}—the “combinatorial structure” of our FSA collapses and we
can represent this trace of the FSA with a simple inputless FSA consisting of a simple
linear path of states. Thus, if we know that i = {1, 0}, our FSA collapses to the following
form:

Figure 5: State transition diagram of same ﬁnite state automaton with input deﬁned as i
= {1, 0}

It is a particular trace such as this that is implemented in every open physical
system, rather than the complete original FSA without inputs deﬁned ahead of time.
And it is this fact that Block ﬁnds objectionable. It isn’t enough that every open physical
system can implement something like Figure 5; rather, for the trivialization argument to
go through, every open physical system must be able to implement something like
Figure 4. So says Block.

EPISTEME XXXI 27

But as Bishop points out, saying that counterfactuals matter commits one to
saying that non-entered machine states have causal powers, a tough pill to swallow. It’s
diﬃcult to see, for instance, how the mere possibility that we could have transited from
state [C] to state [D] (though we did not in fact do so) could have any causal impact on
anything. To drive this point home, we can imagine (as Bishop invites us to do) that we
have a computing machine Q running a program (p) with known input (x) over some
ﬁnite time interval {t1…tk}. Further, let’s suppose that (p) is a Strong AI program such
that running it is suﬃcient for mental states. Now, let’s suppose we turn Q on and let it
run over the time interval in question. Then, over this time interval, Q(p, x) will
generate mental states. Once the time interval is up, we switch Q oﬀ. Now, over the
time interval in question, Q transits a ﬁnite number of states. These state transitions can
be fully replicated with an inputless ﬁnite state automaton. Thus, if Q(p, x) is suﬃcient
for mental states over the ﬁnite time interval in question, then so is this inputless ﬁnite
state automaton. The possibility that Q could have entered diﬀerent states had the input
(x) been diﬀerent clearly has no eﬀect on whether Q has mental states given the input
(x) under consideration. Perhaps Q wouldn’t be very interesting if it could only accept a
single set of inputs, but that would not change the fact that Q would have mental states
over the ﬁnite time interval in question, assuming the truth of Strong AI and
computationalism. Block’s objection, therefore, carries little force.
Thus, just as we can map computational states to electrical states in the case of an
electronic digital computer, we can map computational states to the physical states of
any open physical system. What counts as computation is, therefore, entirely trivial.
Computationalism thus crumbles, establishing part (2) of my thesis.

Conclusion
What I hope to have shown is that the purely computational approach to the
mind is inadequate. What this paper has established is that (1) The thesis that the
appropriately programmed computer, by virtue of running the right program, would
literally have or be a mind in the same sense that you or I have (Strong AI) is false, and
(2) The thesis that mental states are identical to computational states/processes
(computationalism) is similarly false. This is all to say that pure computation can never
be suﬃcient for mind.
What are the implications of this result? Well, if I am right, then we are much
further away from sentient machines than many enthusiasts and futurists believe. For
instance, Amir Husain, the founder and CEO of SparkCognition as well as an author
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and popularizer of AI research, has recently written a book, The Sentient Machine, in
which he argues that sentient AI is seemingly right around the corner. Husain writes
regarding AGI (more on this term in a moment), “Whether in twenty, seventy, or two
hundred years, many in the community agree that AGI is on the horizon” (Husain,
2017, pg. 37).
Regarding the term AGI, Husain distinguishes between artiﬁcial narrow
intelligence (ANI) and artiﬁcial general intelligence (AGI). ANI includes things like
chess-playing programs and self-driving cars. ANI is capable of doing specialized tasks
that would normally be done by a human. AGI, on the other hand, would be capable of
a level of general intelligence and cognitive ability on par or better than that of humans.
As Husain writes, “In order to be considered AGI, an AI system would…need to
understand meaning and context, be able to synthesize new knowledge, have
intentionality, and—in all likelihood—be self-aware, so that it could understand what it
means to have agency in the world” (Husain, 2017, pg. 34). The realization of AGI,
therefore, would entail the truth of Strong AI. But, given the powerful arguments
against Strong AI, we have warrant for thinking that AGI cannot and will not be
realized, despite the sensational prognostications of many in the AI community.
With all this being said, what I have most certainly not shown in this paper is that
sentient machines of any kind are impossible. Perhaps it is possible to construct artiﬁcial
minds. I merely maintain that we won’t get there by way of simply programming a
computer, by way of pure computation.
Notes
1. This is opposed to Weak AI. Weak AI is simply the claim that we can simulate mental
processes with a computer and that computers can provide valuable insights into the
mind and how it might work (pg. 14, 226).
2. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy deﬁnes an eﬀective method as follows: “A
method, or procedure, M, for achieving some desired result is called ‘eﬀective’ (or
‘systematic’ or ‘mechanical’) just in case:
1.
M is set out in terms of a ﬁnite number of exact instructions (each
instruction being expressed by means of a ﬁnite number of symbols);
2.
M will, if carried out without error, produce the desired result in a ﬁnite
number of steps;
3.
M can (in practice or in principle) be carried out by a human being
unaided by any machinery except paper and pencil;
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4.
M demands no insight, intuition, or ingenuity, on the part of the human
being carrying out the method” (Copeland, 2017).
3. I’ll grant, however, that computation may be necessary for mind.
4. For clariﬁcation, it is obvious that the Chinese Room is analogous to a computer. In
fact, it really is a computer (that is, a Turing machine), albeit a quirky one. To cast the
elements of the Chinese Room in Turing’s own computer terminology, Clerk is the
executive unit and the control, and the sheets of paper and rulebook compose the store.
The sheets of paper are where calculations are carried out, and the rulebook is the table
of instructions or the program (Turing, 1950).
5. Edward Feser summarizes Dennett’s idea of homuncular decomposition as follows:
“We can usefully regard our minds as comprised of a number of subsystems that
perform various mental functions: visual processing, linguistic competence, and so on.
Each subsystem can itself be metaphorically understood as a ‘homunculus’—a ‘little
man’ who performs some particular task. But the functions performed by each of these
homunculi can, like our own minds, be thought of as comprised of yet more basic
functions performed by smaller subsystems; in other words, each of the homunculi
comprising our own minds can be thought of as comprising smaller homunculi of its
own” (Feser, 2005, pg. 151).
6. For instance, we can suppose that Clerk internalizes the Room (in the same way as
was done in response to the standard Systems Reply). He memorizes the rulebook and
runs through the program in his head. Furthermore, he implements the sensors by
using his own eyes (and possibly ears as well). And still, merely by virtue of running
the program, Clerk does not understand Chinese. There is certainly more that can be
said for the Robot Reply (for both sides), but for considerations of length for this paper,
I must direct the reader to Selmer Bringsjord and Ron Noel’s article “Real Robots and
the Missing Thought-Experiment in the Chinese Room Dialectic” for further discussion.
7. For example, suppose that x is a rubber tube and y is an esophagus. And suppose the
rubber tube is such that pouring water down it causes it to behave similarly or
identically to the esophagus with water pouring down it. In this case, the rubber tube
simulates the esophagus in this particular context because it replicates the property of
behaving in such-and-such a way when water is pouring down it. The rubber tube
might not, however, duplicate the esophagus because it might fail to replicate other
properties that the esophagus has such as having the property of making solid food
inside it behave in a certain way.
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8. Searle explains this more fully as follows: “Computation is deﬁned purely formally or
abstractly in terms of the implementation of a computer algorithm, and not in terms of
energy transfer. Let me repeat this point: computation as standardly deﬁned does not
name a machine process… Computation is the name of an abstract mathematical
process that can be implemented with machines that engage in energy transfer, but the
energy transfer is not part of the deﬁnition of computation. To state the point with a
little more precision: the notion ‘same-implemented program’ deﬁnes an equivalence
class that is speciﬁed not in terms of physical or chemical processes, but in terms of
abstract mathematical processes” (Searle, 2002, pp. 57).
9. Hauser could reply to this line of argument by insisting that whenever physical
processes are isomorphic to computational processes, the physical processes are
instantiating the computational processes. I shall have more to say about this shortly.
10. In other words, s1 → s2 → s3 → s4 → s5 → s6 is isomorphic to
[A]→[B]→[A]→[B]→[A]→[B].
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A Phenomenology of Consumer Goods
Abhinav Bhargava, University of Toronto
Introduction
A standard introduction to economics will reveal that the hallmark of an
economy is that it contains producers and consumers. Producers create products that
are to be exchanged either with other producers or with consumers. If exchanged with a
consumer, then the good produced is termed as a ‘consumer good’ and is subsequently
‘consumed’ when it is put to use. Essentially, this rough theoretical understanding of a
consumer good reveals that consumer goods travel directly from the hands of the
producer to the mouth of the consumer and are not employed in the production of
another good. Certainly, this deﬁnition does gives us a great deal to work with in our
understanding of consumer goods, and economists would maintain that it captures the
essence of consumer goods. However, it does not give an account of consumer goods as
they exist for us in everyday circumstance. The ontology given by economists in their
treatment of consumer goods is not thick enough. How do we perceive consumer
goods? What do they mean to us? How is our interaction with consumer goods
historically contingent? This essay will be an exercise in expounding this deﬁnition and
broadening our ontology of consumer goods.
In order to uncover these missing elements, we can consult the philosophical
method of phenomenology. Phenomenology is suﬃcient because it is a key tool in
unlocking the meaning behind everyday living. (Zahavi 2019: 9). Essentially, its
methodology of revealing hidden ontological structures begins with taking note of what
in our horizon of experience is meaningfully signiﬁcant, via tracing our intentionality,
and then revealing why it is signiﬁcant through rooting it to an ontological structure
(Husserl 1936: 142). Phenomenological theorists, taking que from Kant, understand that
this fundamental ontological structure is in fact the frame through which we perceive
what is meaningfully signiﬁcant (Loidolt 2017: 111). And so, meaning, for at least
Heidegger and Arendt – the two phenomenologists we shall focus on, is only possible
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because of ontological structures. In the case of Arendt, these ontological structures are
not constant in the sense that they form the essence of the human condition, but rather
they change via transformations in the environment presented before us (Arendt 1958:
10). Phenomenology understands that our reality is constituted by a shifting landscape
of ontological structures that consistently morph and change the way in which we see
things as meaningful. The advantage of understanding the landscape that is present in
our relationship with consumer goods is that we get an appreciation of the nuance and
complexity behind an individual’s consumer experience. Furthermore, we also
understand how our relationship with consumer goods is historically contingent via
understanding the dynamism of hidden ontological structures. In short,
phenomenology is necessary to get at the depth behind everyday interaction with
consumer goods, and it stands in signiﬁcant contrast to how consumer goods are
understood from the third-person, detached perspective of economists.
Dealing with consumer goods
Let us ﬁrst reﬂect upon our everyday relationship with consumer goods. Initially,
this comes across as a daunting task for how could we possibly come up with an
understanding of experiences from riding a bicycle to eating sushi? However, common
to all of these varied experiences is the notion that consumer goods are there to
accommodate a purpose. These are objects of experience that serve as means to an end.
For example: clothing might be ‘consumed’ to appear fashionable, and for some,
clothing is seen to be of value due to how wearing it represents participation in a
fashionable trend. From this example, we get the idea that consumer goods carry
meaning due to how they can be bent towards a purpose. When we are looking at a
shelf at a grocery store only the goods that carry some meaning for us are highlighted.
Our eyes seem to glaze over the ones that don’t have any relevance to us. To ﬂesh out
this notion that our interaction with consumer goods is one that is always pointed to a
particular end, let’s introduce some terminology from Heidegger.
For Heidegger (1927: 97), entities that are employed to serve an end are called
equipment, and within the perception of these entities is a whole totality of referential
equipment. The making use of equipment is called dealing with equipment (Heidegger
1927: 95). In the dealing of these entities, our gaze is pointed to a speciﬁc end or
separate set of equipment that would achieve that end. In Heideggerian terms, the end
is called the assignment and the separate equipment complementary to completing the
assignment is called the reference (Heidegger 1927: 97). So, for example, when buying
clothes, your mind might be directed towards the price tag. Which would then be
directed to the cash in your wallet. Which would then be directed to the cashier where
we pay for the clothes (if the price is lower than the amount of cash in your wallet).
What we encounter in this example is the notion of the totality of equipment that
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brightens up, demands our attention, and precedes reaching our end (Heidegger 1927:
97). The cashier, your wallet, the price tag, these are all separate equipment that is
necessarily used to consume clothes. This is only so because our attention is not
primarily concerned with consumer good itself, it is primarily concerned with the end
to which the consumer good can be put to use to, the assignment of the consumer good;
hence there may be a totality of referential equipment the consumer good points to in
order for us to complete the assignment. So, generally speaking, in dealing with a
consumer good, we are aware of and make use of several other equipment.
Further, when we do deal with consumer goods, we are situated as a
being-in-the-world that can either immerse itself in dealing or can deliberate before
dealing. Being-in-the-world is what Heidegger calls our subjective existential state of
being (Heidegger 1927: 78). If being-in-the-world, namely the subject, immerses itself in
the completion of the assignment of equipment, then the equipment appears
ready-to-hand and we immediately proceed to make use of it (Heidegger 1927: 98).
Moreover, if the equipment is ready-to-hand then we do not deliberate before dealing
with it (Heidegger 1927: 98). In the context of consumer goods, if the consumer good
appears as ready-to-hand then we proceed to consume without any theoretical
consideration of the consumer good. It is important to note that, an explication of
consumer goods as ready-to-hand is exactly the purpose of a phenomenology of
consumer goods. For if we are to deliberate before its consumption then the ontological
structures that showcase why the consumer good is meaningful remain hidden. This
point can be further emphasized by understanding that the knowledge of that which is
ready-to-hand is already known to us. The reason why it is already known is because
we make use of it so immediately. What we are not consciously aware of is not the
‘know-how’ of the consumer good, but instead the reason why it is so. Why is its
consumption so immediately obvious to our being? The reasons why are exactly the
ontological structures that lie underneath our perception of consumer goods. Hence,
only in dealing with consumer goods that are ready-to-hand can we reveal what is
ontologically meaningful. On the other hand, if we are to depart from viewing
equipment as ready-to-hand, then equipment appears as present-at-hand. Seeing
entities as present-at-hand is to hesitate and deliberate before making use of an object in
your horizon of experience (Heidegger 1927: 101). Accompanied with a methodology of
understanding a present-at-hand entity is an attempt to ﬁt the entity in a theory. In the
context of consumer goods, this is the attempt made by economists. Although as we
have seen, the economist approach to consumer goods lacks an appreciation of the
meaning that consumer goods carry for humans in their everyday living. In other
words, the present-at-hand entity exists ontically without the support of any
meaningful structures through which it takes a position of meaningful relevance in our
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perception. Hence, the aim of our investigation is to understand consumer goods as
ready-to-hand.
So far, we have been focusing on the perception of a single consumer good. But,
as we have shown before, in the phenomenological analysis of a single consumer good,
a whole set of referential equipment, a man-made world of equipment, also lights up
and demands our attention. What this points to is the notion that our
being-in-the-world rests upon perception of an entire world. Furthermore, the totality of
referential equipment reveals that being-in-the-world is only possible because of the
existence of a world (Heidegger 1927: 91). This is because without a world, namely a
whole set of referential equipment that forms the backdrop of any perception, there
could be no being-in-the-world. Hence, a key existential condition for
being-in-the-world, and therefore our interaction with consumer goods as a whole, is
worldliness. Worldliness, and its corresponding activity – dealing with equipment,
therefore forms our ﬁrst discovery of an ontological structure that exists underneath our
perception of consumer good. Although, I will elaborate on this notion of worldliness
later with our treatment of Arendt. So, all in all, we have a working theory of the
structure of our perception when we interact with consumer goods. We exist as
being-in-the-world and consumer goods present themselves as a distribution of
meaningful equipment. The primary condition upon which our perception is so is the
condition of worldliness. Consuming goods is exemplary for the putting to use of the
tools and equipment set before us in the world to serve a particular end.
But such a theory seems to only oﬀers us knowledge of what is meaningful based
upon the sole existential condition of worldliness. That we exist in this world, and that
the condition of our existence is that we exist with equipment. Consumer goods are
certainly equipment, and we could very well stop our existential phenomenology here
and be content with the answer that consumer goods are ready-to-hand and to be ‘put
to use to serve an end’. However, I would rather push our philosophy a bit further. To
serve what end? Do we consume in order to survive? Do we consume in order to be
social? Or how about in order to transcend mortality? We have yet to account for the
speciﬁc human motivations and drives in our analysis of consumer goods so far. So, to
develop a deeper appreciation of our relationship with consume goods, I propose
diversifying the range of existential human activities. We don’t just put things to use for
an end, we put things to use in order to survive, in order to create, in order to bond with
our fellow humans, in order to escape our limitations. Are these not existential
activities? Which in turn are actualizations of existential conditions? Don’t we get the
sense that we come into this world with a diversity of conditions that enable to us to do
a diversity of actions? Perhaps we should look for a more plural set of conditions upon
which the broad range of human activities can be thought of theoretically. This will
allow us to think of our activity of consumption more speciﬁcally, and it will allow us to
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move to a more nuanced perception of how we consume – rather than just the simplistic
understanding that it is ‘putting an object in the world to use for a particular end’.
Which in turn will allow us to dig deeper into those meaningful ontological structures
that underlie our perception and grasping of ready-to-hand consumer goods.
Not only are we looking for a diverse range of ontological structures, but also
structures that can be transformed with respect to changes in our environment or the
activities of other humans. We need structures that are responsive to human activity,
cultural activity and historical activity. This is because consumption patterns have
changed throughout history. The introduction of certain economic ideals, political
structures, and ideological beliefs have made their impact upon our relationship with
consumer goods. Which would imply that the ontological structures present in
consumer goods are dynamic. What we are therefore also looking for is a set of
existential conditions that are historically contingent, or at least, the process of the
actualization of these conditions are historically contingent. It is for these separate
reasons – of looking for a plural set of existential conditions that will allow us to zoom
in onto our relationship with consumer goods more speciﬁcally, and of looking for a set
of conditions that are historically contingent – that we move to Arendt’s ﬁvefold
existential conditions.
Pluralizing our range of existential conditions – Arendt’s ﬁvefold existential
conditions
In the Human Condition, Arendt draws a picture of ﬁve existential conditions
upon which being-in-the-world rests upon. Such conditions are life, worldliness,
plurality, natality and mortality (Arendt 1958: 7-10). Each condition forms the ground
upon which activity takes place (Loidolt 2017: 113). Further, each condition has a logic
to its actualization (Loidolt 2017: 113). Life is the condition of ﬁnding oneself in a body
(Arendt 1958: 7). It’s actualizing activity – labor – demands the seeking of survival,
shelter, water, food, etc. in accordance to one’s metabolic processes. (Arendt 1958: 7).
Moreover, labor also demands a participation in nature, as the source of human
sustenance is nature itself (Arendt 1958: 96). Because nature itself is cyclical – the change
of the seasons, the ripening and decaying of fruit, the decayed food re-entering the cycle
of life to provide for more food, etc. – labor too is oriented along this cyclical dimension
(Arendt 1958: 98). Eating, sleeping, procreation, excretion – all are bent in accordance to
a cyclical logic of release and renewal, exhaustion and pleasure (Arendt 1958: 98).
Worldliness is the condition of ﬁnding oneself in a totality of equipment (as a student of
Heidegger, Arendt did take from him). The condition of being brought into the human
artiﬁce, a man-made landscape (Arendt 1958: 7). The logic of work – the actualization of
worldliness - is not only dealing with equipment but is also to create a world (Arendt
1958: 7). The aim is to create a world that is durable, to create structures and institutions
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that stand the test of time, such that humans can be at home in the great cosmos (Arendt
1958: 137). Plurality is the condition of ﬁnding oneself among other people (Arendt
1958: 7). Action is the activity which corresponds to plurality and is manifest in
dialogue and speech. The logic of action is to express individuality amongst a plural
setting (Arendt 1958: 178). To communicate in order to form a connection with our
fellow humans (Arendt 1958: 175). In this essay, the ﬁnal two conditions have limited
reference to consumer goods, but for the sake of completeness they will be mentioned
here. Natality is the condition upon which we choose to bring forth things into the
world (Arendt 1958: 10). It is the condition that is the source of our eﬀort to add to the
world, to our community and to bring about the new. Mortality is the condition upon
which our activities are motivated by the threat of death (Arendt 1958: 10). For Arendt,
these ﬁve conditions are revealed in our everyday experience as humans, in our
perception and in our engagement with our surroundings. Now our aim is to root our
relationship with consumer goods as an activation of one or more of these ﬁve
conditions. For this will allow us to speak of the ontological meaning behind
consumption. However, before we begin to do this, we must venture into the structure
of conditions and how they are actualized through activity.
Activities, Conditions, and Spaces of Meaning
Within our perception, consumption goods are ontologically rooted in a plurality
of spaces of meaning. However, before we get to spaces of meaning, let’s ﬁrst
understand the relationship between conditions and activities. Activities guide our
behaviour, comportment and perception. Arendt’s 3 activities - labor, work and action are not ‘labels’ or ‘categories’ that singular events can be shelved under (Loidolt 2017:
111). They are experience-ordering. They reveal what is meaningful to us upon their
enactment (Loidolt 2017: 111). They are “ways of taking place” that unfold and spill
over into our everyday life (Loidolt 2017: 111), thereby tainting and coloring everything
that we see. So, eating, drinking, sleeping, these are not activities of labor, but rather are
activities through which we experience labor as a guide to our comportment. On the
other hand, conditions are “actualized” into activities (Loidolt 2017: 113). And in their
actualization, and the subsequent reﬂection of being-in-the-world, or ‘Dasein’, they are
revealed as fundamental structures that exist as antecedent to activity (Loidolt 2017:
113). So, for example, labor, as that activity that bends our experience towards
sustaining the biological process of the human body, is only shapes our experience
because of the fact that we are alive (Loidolt 2017: 113). If we were robots then we
would not be alive in the same way that we are, and there would be no need for labor as
an experience-ordering perspective. The activity cannot exist without its condition and
the condition cannot be revealed to us without its actualization into activity (Loidolt
2017: 113). For Arendt, the enactment of a condition directly results in the taking on of a
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hermeneutic perspective, in which entities appear rooted to ontological structures. The
hermeneutic perspectives that we take on as a result of doing labor, work and action are
animal laborans, homo faber and zoon politikon (Loidolt 2017: 114). Our surroundings
are subsequently morphed into a space of meaning whose inner rules are determined
by the speciﬁc hermeneutic perspective we take on (Loidolt 2017: 114). We do not just
embody one hermeneutic perspective at a time. Homo Faber needs food, Animal
Laborans uses tools (Loidolt 2017: 113). Meaning that these modes of existence,
hermeneutic perspectives, enactments of conditions are consistently folding into each
other (Loidolt 2017: 116). Their respective spaces of meaning, the ontological structures
that underlie our surroundings, also overlap and interpenetrate each other (Loidolt
2017: 116). Now that we are armed with a whole plethora of conditions and
hermeneutic perspectives, we can use these to develop an understanding of how we
perceive consumer goods. Upon ﬁrst glance we already notice that depending upon the
consumer good we wish to analyze the distribution of the spaces of meaning present
changes. So for clothes and fashion, there is an element of survival in that some clothes
are necessary for protection against the weather, and therefore the labor space of
meaning is present, but there is also an element of expression, of showing that you are
diﬀerent from others by wearing diﬀerent clothes, and hence the action space of
meaning is also present. Furthermore, the consumption of non-necessary goods is in
itself an activity that does reveal an attribute of your individual persona, and hence it
must be constituted by either the action or work space of meaning. However, I would
maintain the consumption of necessary goods such as water, food, goods whole sole
purpose is to enter and sustain the life cycle, is constituted mainly by the labor space of
meaning. Although for the most part, we see that in our perception of consumer goods
there is a folding of several spaces of meaning into each other.
Dynamic Spaces of Meaning
Whilst our perception of consumer goods does contain a diverse set of spaces of
meaning, not all of these spaces of meaning are equal in how they constitute the entirety
of our horizon of experience. There are dominant spaces of meaning and they are
submissive spaces of meaning (Loidolt 2017: 118). Dominant spaces of meaning take up
much of the entirety of our horizon of experience and they are concomitant with the
domination of a particular kind of hermeneutic perspective (Loidolt 2017: 118). The
domination of a space of meaning is contingent upon certain historical events. Broadly
speaking, historical events are characterized with the introduction of new logics that
depart from prior logics of activity. This introduction therefore also changes what is
meaningful in the corresponding hermeneutic perspective and the space of meaning
itself. Subsequently, any activity that derives its purpose from that changed space of
meaning must change with respect to the new logic. If the new logic proves to be
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particularly successful by the metrics of a society, then the space of meaning will
expand and envelop much of the horizon of experience of the conscious subject. Hence,
in order to get a grasp at our experience with consumer goods, we must understand
which space of meaning is dominant in our perception of consumer goods and
understand how that space of meaning has grown to be dominant. We must, therefore,
embark on a project of building the history of ontological structures behind our current
perception of consumer goods.
The Rise of Homo Faber
In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt goes to great lengths to deliver a
historical overview of the dynamics of diﬀerent spaces of meaning. We will examine
those dynamics that have a direct impact on our current perception of consumer goods.
In order to avoid recounting the whole of Arendt’s historical excursion, we will just
focus on the Renaissance era onwards. With that in mind, let us begin in the
Renaissance where the dominant space of meaning was the work space of meaning.
Some of the initial key ﬁgures that proposed this perspective were Galileo, Leonardo Da
Vinci, and Michelangelo. Galileo, in particular, had a huge role to play because of the
successes of his scientiﬁc experimental method (Arendt 1958: 295). He had shown that
via fabricating natural processes, in a controlled way, we can come to learn about what
nature is (Arendt 1958: 295). Nature can then be revealed via understanding its
processes (Arendt 1958: 295). This oﬀered mankind an immense power over nature, and
this power became increasingly obvious such that more people began to trust in the
ideals of homo faber; namely, they began to trust in the vision that our surroundings are
constituted by processes (Arendt 1958: 296). The dominant space of meaning, therefore,
became that of work. Everything, all of nature, the human body itself, became a means,
a tool to be used. We see this most clearly in the mechanistic philosophies as promoted
by Hobbes and Descartes and in the introduction of biology to the scientiﬁc community
(Arendt 1958: 296-297). This attitude to which the people of the Renaissance and Early
Modern era brought to their shared horizon of experience could be encapsulated in this
quote from Immanuel Kant – “Give me matter and I can construct a world out of it”
(Arendt 1958: 296).
With the accumulation of wealth and technology, the world began to resemble
nature, therefore initiating the corruption of the work space of meaning by the logic of
labor. Upon the dawn of the industrial era, we see that mankind has complete trust in
the vision of homo faber. This resulted in mankind experiencing huge surpluses in
wealth and technology (Arendt 1958: 105). Furthermore, built in the logic of homo faber
was the expectation that the activity of world-building would only continue (Arendt
1958: 7). That the building of an economy would result in further growth of the
economy. That “money begets money” and “power begets power” (Arendt 1958: 105).

EPISTEME XXXI 40

As a consequence, the world - as the sum of wealth, technology, man-made equipment,
tools - was growing by an incredible rate. Homo faber became so successful in its
world-building mission that in the eyes of mankind, the size of the world began to
resemble the size of nature. Moreover, the incredible ﬂow with which wealth and
technologies superseded each other resembled the great cyclical processes of nature
(Arendt 1958: 106). The growing abundance of necessary goods mirrored the fertility of
nature (Arendt 1958: 106). The growing number of goods also promoted further
consumption, and this promoted industries to create more goods (Arendt 1958: 133).
The cyclical nature of this consumption found its way into all industries and economies,
beginning with necessary goods like food, to all sorts of superﬂuities such as luxury
goods (Arendt 1958: 133). Hence, more and more, what were originally products of
work, slowly became products for consumption. What we are beginning to see is how
the previously dominant space of meaning – that of work - is being dominated by the
labor space of meaning. The logic of labor slowly spills into the work space of meaning
as processes became faster and more repetitive, thereby approximating the logic of
exhaustion and regeneration. This logic found its way into the work space of meaning
because the boundaries between world and nature began to crumble as the world grew
in size and grew to resemble nature. We slowly began to see the world through the eyes
of animal laborans, as something that is to be incorporated in great cyclical processes.
The Victory of Animal Laborans
Due to the emphasis on production the labor space of meaning becomes
dominant. During the industrial era, production became an ideal (Arendt 1958: 307). In
order to sustain the abundance of consumer goods and economic success, production in
the workplace needed to be stressed. This had the eﬀect of moving the value in a
produced good from what it is essentially, to what it could be used for to produce more
(Arendt 1958: 308). Shifting this value subsequently contributed to the deterioration of
the world, for if there was no value to be found in possible permanent, durable features
of the world, then there is no necessity to keep them (Arendt 1958: 309). Instead, their
value stems from what they can be used for, which essentially made them valueless in
themselves (Arendt 1958: 309). The valuelessness of the world, as the sum of valueless
producer goods, therefore, demoted the work space of meaning as subservient. This
contributed to the fall of homo faber. Furthermore, In the modern era’s manic pursuit of
‘productivity’ certain production eﬃciencies were introduced. Such as the Division of
Labor, which was essentially to divide the production process into multiple
departments such that unskilled workers can participate in the workforce, thereby
heightening the number of people working at once, and shortening the duration and
cost for product creation. In doing this, the ideals of homo faber were undermined as
the goods created were not the product of skilled workmanship (Arendt 1958: 123).
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There was no record of the individual inside these products (Arendt 1958: 123). Rather,
the meaning behind these goods was derived from the labor space of meaning. These
goods are meant to be consumed at a rapid pace, there were not meant to be durable
entities that stand the test of time (Arendt 1958: 125). So, we also get the broadening of
the label ‘consumer good’ to not only include goods to be literally consumed but also
‘goods’ that used to be products of work such as ‘chairs, tables, houses, etc.’ As homo
faber fell, animal laborans rose.
The promotion of the principle of happiness and the introduction of new life
philosophies further cemented the dominance of animal laborans. As consumer goods
became more abundant, the pleasure of consumption became more accessible (Arendt
1958: 108). This combined with the reduction of pain and eﬀort in the production
process resulted in the promotion of the principle of happiness (Arendt 1958: 108).
“Happiness became concomitant with labor itself”, which cemented the logic of life as
this was the kind of happiness found in surplus consumption and limited labor (Arendt
1958: 108). This notion of happiness became so overwhelming that philosophers such as
Jeremy Bentham had founded whole philosophical systems, like utilitarianism and the
principle of the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, to it
(Arendt 1958: 309). Our experience is now bent towards the notion of procuring
economic progress and consumer good abundance. Such that we can continue to
consume and to be happy in our repetitive consumption. In addition to this, there were
a number of philosophies and scientiﬁc discoveries that seemed to also promote the
purpose of human existence as sustaining the life process such as Darwin’s evolutionary
theory and Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ (Arendt 1958: 116-117). The deterioration of the
world, the focus on productivity and abundance, the expectation of happiness upon
consumption, and the rational ground upon which labor can be said to be the purpose
of human existence provided by thinkers such as Darwin and Nietzsche, all combined
to promote the hermeneutic perspective of animal laborans over all. Consequently, our
society today seems to be oriented around the logic of “securing the necessities of life,
providing for their abundance”, and the seeking of happiness in consumption. To sum
up, our comportment towards consumer goods today derives its orientation from the
labor space of meaning. Consumer goods are seen to be entities that can not only
provide sustenance but also provide happiness, a release from exhaustion. Further, they
are seen to be highly abundant to the point where they resemble the fertility of nature,
and hence our awareness of the limited resources used in their creation is itself very
limited. Moreover, by the domination of the labor space of meaning over the work space
of meaning, products of work that were meant to be worldly “lose their character and
become more and more objects of consumption”. For people in this consumer society,
the whole world, no longer viewed from the perspective of homo faber, becomes a
consumer good (Arendt 1958: 132).

EPISTEME XXXI 42

Conclusion
All in all, the philosophies of both Heidegger, who gave us the methodology of
understanding consumption goods through perceiving it only as ready-to-hand, and
Arendt, who provided us with a historical overview of the hermeneutic perspectives we
take with respect to consumer goods, have provided us with a rough picture of the
hidden ontological structures underneath our perception of consumer goods. The
plurality of these ontological structures, spaces of meaning, have allowed us to diversify
the range of reasons why consumption is meaningful. And, the tracing of the history of
these plural spaces of meaning has shown us why our current perception of consumer
goods is more or less constituted only by the labor space of meaning. Of course, that is
not to say that there is no element of the work and action space of meaning present in
our perception of consumer goods, only that the labor space of meaning has grown to
be the most dominant. With this in mind, it is important to stress that our Arendtian
approach to a phenomenology of consumer goods is far from ﬁnished. We have yet to
dig into the history of the action, natality and mortality spaces of meaning with respect
to consumption. How is the consumption of a good an expression of our individuality?
Is repetitive consumption of goods eﬀectively silencing our ability to act? Furthermore,
there is a vast multitude of historical events that have spanned the time since Arendt
wrote the Human Condition and I began writing this report, all of which had an eﬀect
on the logic of all spaces of meaning. The fall of competing economic systems such as
that of the USSR, the introduction of e-commerce and fast fashion, the increasing
immateriality of consumer products such as music streaming and online subscriptions,
the pressures of climate change and environmental degradation to cease consumption
altogether – all alter the spaces of meaning present in our perception of consumption
goods. A phenomenology of consumer goods for today would account for these
historical shifts. Whilst this paper does show how the phenomenological methodologies
of Heidegger and Arendt are extremely relevant at getting behind the meaning of
consumption, it is still incomplete in that it does not oﬀer us a complete breadth of
analysis of all existential conditions, nor does it oﬀer a complete history of the dynamics
of all relevant spaces of meaning. Although, future projects in the phenomenology of
consumer goods may now depart from this point.
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Carving Out Space for Aristotle’s Megalopsychos
Susanna McGrew, Swarthmore College
The megalopsychos

[1]

is the most reviled of Aristotle’s virtuous characters today, but he

was a paragon of virtue in the 4th century BCE. Other virtues that Aristotle praised such
as courage, generosity, and temperance are still recognized as excellent and worthy of
striving to reach. A megalopsychos is deﬁned simply as someone “who thinks himself
[2]
worthy of great things and is worthy of them” (1123b2-3), though what exactly it
means to be worthy of great things is open to some interpretation. Although Aristotle
draws his portrait against the backdrop of Ancient Athens, where some groups of
people were accepted as categorically inferior to others, nothing in this deﬁnition
requires that the megalopsychos can only exist in such a society. Alasdair MacIntyre
points to Aristotle’s complacency with his social order and suggests that “it is perhaps
[3]
no accident he also believes that some men are slaves by nature.” If we reject what
Aristotle says about natural slaves, we should also be able to reject other inequalities in
the social context he describes without having to reject his valuable insights about
virtue. For the virtue of megalopsychia to have relevance today, it is not necessary that we
accept it in the same form that Aristotle endorsed over two thousand years ago. If the
deﬁning features of megalopsychia – greatness and correct self-evaluation of greatness –
are still useful concepts, then megalopsychia is still worth thinking about.
Most modern critics, however, would deny that the deﬁning features of megalopsychia
are useful to us. Nancy Sherman and Alasdair MacIntyre, in particular, argue that there
is no place for the megalopsychos today because he is exempt from ordinary morality and
[4]
because he essentially belongs to a society of unequals. We have strong reasons for
wanting people in our community to share our conceptions of morality and (even more
importantly) not to want them to undermine the state of equality that we strive to reach.
If megalopsychia implied either of those things, we could reasonably consider it a vice. In
response to Sherman and MacIntyre, I will argue that we can carve out space for the
virtue of the megalopsychos today by diﬀusing the objections that he is exempt from
ordinary morality and that he belongs only to a society of unequals. Far from it being an
obsolete virtue that we should now shun, I will argue that we should instead embrace
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megalopsychia as an admirable contemporary virtue that still has much to teach us about
reaching toward the good and about self-understanding.
I.
Objection: the megalopsychos is exempt from ordinary morality
Let us assume that someone who considers himself exempt from ordinary morality is
unattractive because he undermines our conﬁdence in our own morality, he cannot be
relied upon to do “the right thing,” and we have diﬃculty relating to him. An
interpretation of the megalopsychos as exempt from ordinary morality, I will suggest,
rests on a misunderstanding of what motivates him, namely that he is more moved by
personal honor (which, let us assume, is not a permissible motivation under ordinary
morality) than by good (which is). On my view the megalopsychos is correctly
understood as motivated by the good; this objection is therefore not compelling. I do
not spell out what ordinary morality is exactly but assume that there is such a thing that
most people would not reasonably object to. Various conceptions of the good ﬁt into
ordinary morality and my argument does not rest on a speciﬁc account of it.
The objection is clearly articulated by Nancy Sherman, who contends that “acting from
[5]
grand scale virtues exempts an agent from ordinary moral service.” Her criticism is
similar to others that Howard Curzer responds to, including that the megalopsychos is
ungrateful and manipulative; inactive and remote; self-absorbed; and unsympathetic,
[6]
inaccessible, and insuﬃciently benevolent. Sherman’s primary evidence that the
megalopsychos is exempt is Aristotle’s comment that, “it is characteristic of the
[megalopsychos] not to aim at things commonly held in honor, or the things in which
others excel; to be sluggish and hold back except where great honor or great work is at
stake, and to be a man of few deeds, but of great and noble ones” (1124b13-15). To
Sherman, his infrequent performance of great actions is an excuse for the megalopsychos
[7]
to neglect “ongoing and persistent concern for the welfare of others” and instead
focus on actions that will bring him the greatest honor. For Sherman, the megalopsychos’
grand actions are inherently motivated by his desire to be honored. She characterizes
him as of “the sort that typically reap honor, that will beﬁt his position and importance.
He does not easily surrender moments for such display.” As a result, “the scope of his
desire to help is restricted” by his desire for opportunities to act in ways that will bring
[8]
him honor.
While it is true that the megalopsychos, as Aristotle describes him, is particularly
concerned with honor (1123b16 and 1124a13), Sherman is mistaken about the form of
that concern. Far from being a motivation, honor and external recognition are merely
eﬀects of being good; he wants honor only as conﬁrmation of his goodness. He pursues
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the good because he just is good (it would be an “utter absurdity” for him not to be
good (1123b34)), not because the rewards that follow from pursuing the good (such as
being honored) are independently pleasant. Aristotle is careful to mention that the
megalopsychos does not consider honor to be “a very great thing” (1124a18). He merely
accepts it as his just desert, being pleased when it comes from sources that he considers
capable of recognizing honor (“good men”) and unmoved when it comes from those he
deems incapable of recognizing it (“casual people”) (1123b18 and 1124a10-13). If the
megalopsychos’ focus on actions that will bring him honor is interpreted as a focus on the
actions that aim at the greatest good rather than on those that are most rewarded, then
his motivation is no longer outside the scope of ordinary morality. A careful reading of
Aristotle’s description of the megalopsychos suggests that he is better understood as
motivated by the good than by personal honor.
Translations may aﬀect our reading of what seems to motivate the megalopsychos. For
[9]
[10]
example, the word kataphronei is roughly “looking down” in English.
Michael
Pakaluk translates it as, “Because the great-hearted man shows contempt, with
[11]
justiﬁcation, since he has a true assessment of things,”
while Christian Rowe
translates, “For the great-souled person is justiﬁed in looking down on people (since his
[12]
judgements are true).”
Because, as Pakaluk notes, kataphronei does not have a
grammatical object in Greek, one can kataphronei without doing so to speciﬁc
[13]
individuals.
Rowe’s translation suggests that the megalopsychos is thought here
essentially comparative, while Pakaluk’s does not. Another example is hyperechein, from
hyper (more) and echo (to have). David Ross translates that “the proud man wishes to be
[14]
superior,”
while Pakaluk renders, “the point is to excel.” Pakaluk comments that
hyperechein “is not meant to imply comparison with others;” it means “to excel over
oneself: to do something, obviously available to you, that would make your doing the
other alternative presenting itself to you–perhaps the easier alternative–look to be
[15]
something inferior.”
The word “superior” again brings in an element of comparison
that Aristotle may not have intended and suggests what I suspect is an inappropriate
self-centeredness. These modern connotations might make us view megalopsychia in
ways Aristotle did not intend.
Turning to the text, Aristotle deﬁnes the megalopsychos as a person “who thinks himself
worthy of great things and is worthy of them” (1123b2). Greatness is not categorically
diﬀerent from goodness but is rather a great quantity of goodness – possessing very
many good virtues and possessing them to a high degree. Given the textual context,
Curzer suggests that those great things are “the external goods (wealth, power, beauty,
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honor, etc.).”

[16]

This deﬁnition is puzzling because the megalopsychos is supposed to be

above caring about external goods, which are only instrumentally rather than
intrinsically good: he will “bear himself with moderation towards wealth and power
and all good or evil fortune, whatever may befall him, and will be neither overjoyed by
good fortune nor over-pained by evil” (1124a14-17). In fact, Aristotle suggests that
having great things is only meaningful when it reﬂects being honored: “Everything that
has a superiority in good is held in greater honor… but in truth the good man alone is to
be honored” (1124a23). Similarly, being honored is only important insofar as it is a
marker of being virtuous: although individuals with great wealth will be honored by
some, “those who without virtue have such goods are neither justiﬁed in making great
claims nor entitled to the name of ‘[megalopsychos]’; for these things imply perfect
virtue” (1124a26-29). What is really at issue with the greatness of the megalopsychos is
that he himself must be good. My argument is that the material goods part, though part
[17]
of how Aristotle deﬁnes the virtue, is not essential
. Rather, it points to something
essential to the virtue: goodness and possession of other virtues. This interpretation is
supported by Aristotle’s explicit statement that “the truly [megalopsychos] must be good.
And greatness in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a [megalopsychos]”
(1123b29).
Aristotle uses external goods in his deﬁnition to mean the same thing as goodness
because in his society external goods, virtue, and honor were all connected. He observes
that, “men who are well-born are thought worthy of honor, and so are those who enjoy
power or wealth; for they are in a superior position, and everything that has a
superiority in some good is held in greater honor” (1124a23). But Aristotle subsequently
undermines the validity of this connection in claiming that “in truth the good man
alone is to be honored” and “those who without virtue have such goods are neither
justiﬁed in making great claims nor entitled to the name of [megalopsychos]; for these
things imply perfect virtue” (1124a24-29). His ﬁrst claim that virtue and honor are
connected reﬂects the social conventions he observed, while the second claim that only
the good man should be honored reﬂects philosophical reasoning about the
implications of virtue. In response to the tension between the two claims, it makes sense
to reject the ﬁrst in favor of the second. The second follows from reasoning about what
virtue is, while the ﬁrst is only correct in a certain social context.
Interpretations like Sherman’s likely result from overlooking the important distinction
between being honored and being worthy of honor. Only the latter is important for the
megalopsychos, although the connection between external goods and honor depends on
the former. Nor is being worthy of honor important in itself. Megalopsychoi care about
being worthy of honor because it is an indication of what they really care about, being
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virtuous: “honor is the prize of virtue, and it is to the good that it is rendered,”
(1123b35) and “not even toward honor does [the megalopsychos] bear himself as if it were
a very great thing” (1124a17). Aristotle concludes that “power and wealth are desirable
for the sake of honor” (1124a18) and separately seems to recognize that honor is
desirable only insofar as it indicates being virtuous. Being worthy of great things (such
as power and wealth) is therefore desirable because it indicates being virtuous, which is,
after all, what the truly good person aims at. A deﬁning feature of the megalopsychos is
not that he is, and knows he is, worthy of great external goods, but rather that he is, and
knows he is, virtuous. I will take up the question of what makes megalopsychia a distinct
virtue in the ﬁnal section.
We might question Aristotle’s claim that “it makes no diﬀerence whether we consider
the state of the character or the man characterized by it” (1123b1). The state of the
character describes what is essential about the megalopsychos, while the man
characterized by it is the product of that character living in a speciﬁc society. If Aristotle
only considers the megalopsychos in his own society, his conﬂation of being honored with
being worthy of honor is not hugely consequential. But I aim to consider the modern
megalopsychos, removed from Aristotle’s context. It makes a diﬀerence to that endeavor
whether I consider the character itself or the (socially placed) man characterized by it.
Let us assume that people today do not accord honor on the basis of power and wealth
in the same way (in fact, we sometimes think powerful and wealthy people are more
likely than average to be morally corrupt), so the goods-honor connection is lost. From
my interpretation of Aristotle’s text, virtue (part of pursuit the good) is the
megalopsychos’ motivation, not personal honor. Thinking that the megalopsychos is
motivated by honor implies a connection between honor, goodness and virtue, that we
may no longer consider valid.
If he is not motivated by personal honor, then there is little textual evidence to support
the idea that the megalopsychos considers himself exempt from the demands of ordinary
morality. As noted above, he will “be a man of few deeds, but of great and noble ones”
(1124b25). As such, he is willing to face great dangers for the sake of important things,
but not willing to undertake “triﬂing” dangers for the sake of less important things
(1124b8). He may perform acts that are greater than what we typically do in our
everyday lives (he may end up risking his life for the sake of justice, for example,
because his acts that are more purely motivated by consideration of the good than by
personal concerns ), but that does not entail that he is acting on a diﬀerent morality.
That he chooses to act on moral considerations even when there is much at stake instead
of only when the risks to acting morally are triﬂing does not mean that he adheres to a
morality that disregards the welfare of other people as trivial, or that he uses his great
acts as an excuse for not performing more trivial acts. As even Sherman recognizes, we
cannot help everyone. We must discriminate between possible actions. Her concern is

EPISTEME XXXI 49

that the megalopsychos makes those discriminations on the basis of the wrong reasons
and motivations. I have argued that there is no reason to think that he does. If
discriminations are made on the basis of what will be the most good rather than on the
basis of considering other people unimportant or a reﬂection of what will bring him the
most prestige, then it is not inconsistent with ordinary morality that the megalopsychos
may act in ways that other people recognize as good and for which they may even
honor him.
II.
Objection: the megalopsychos is “essentially a member of a society of
unequals”
Being incompatible with a society of equals is an even more troubling objection for the
megalopsychos. If he is essentially a member of a society of unequals, then the
megalopsychos’s existence in our society suggests that our society is not and cannot be a
society of equals. Alasdair MacIntyre makes this objection by arguing that the
megalopsychos is “essentially a member of a society of unequals” because his
“characteristic attitudes require a society of superiors and inferiors in which he can
[18]
exhibit his peculiar brand of condescension.”
In the society in which Aristotle ﬁnds
himself, it is certainly true that the megalopsychos acts on the recognition that certain
others are inferior to him. But for this objection to be compelling, it needs to explain
why inequality is bad and what it means to be equals in society. MacIntyre’s objection
does not spell out either. Set against an account of equality that locates the harm of
inequality as standing in the way of the kind of human relationships that are necessary
to ﬂourishing and that deﬁnes equality as relational political equality, I would suggest
that the speciﬁc inequality in goodness that the megalopsychos is essentially part of does
not cause the harmful kind of political relational inequality that obstructs human
ﬂourishing. In other words, the megalopsychos is not essentially a member of a society of
relational political unequals, so the thought that he might be essentially a part of
inequality in something else, like goodness, is not troubling.
A possible response to MacIntyre’s objection is to argue that while some of the attitudes
that Aristotle attributes to the megalopsychos can only exist in a society of unequals,
those “characteristic attitudes” are not deﬁning character traits. Rather, they are
characteristics of the megalopsychos in the speciﬁc society in which he is described. These
attitudes include despising honors oﬀered by common people, not caring to conceal his
opinion because he has a poor opinion of others, and always repaying beneﬁts with
interest so as to remain in the position of a benefactor. Someone who possesses
megalopsychia (understood as being good and knowing that he is good) in a diﬀerent
society that lacks relations of superiority would not share those same attitudes.

EPISTEME XXXI 50

This line of argument can at most show that the megalopsychos can exist in some
particular idealized society. I would like to suggest that he can exist in our society. To
support that claim, I must argue that he is compatible with the speciﬁc type of equality
that might be said to (ideally) characterize our society. Consider one conception of
relational political equality along the lines of Elizabeth Anderson’s conception of
[19]
democratic equality.
She argues that egalitarians seek to live in a democratic (rather
than hierarchical) society where people are collectively self-determined through open
discussion among equals and governed by rules acceptable to all. People stand in
equality to each other through discussion: each member of society is entitled to
[20]
participate,
other members recognize an obligation to listen and respond
respectfully, and nobody need represent themselves as inferior to make their claims
heard. For Anderson, equality is essentially relational and ensures fair treatment in the
political process. This theory is attractive because it aﬃrms that all people have worth
and have a voice, while still allowing that they may diﬀer substantially in their talents,
virtues, and other individual characteristics. Traits that we intuitively think have moral
signiﬁcance, such as kindness and generosity, may indeed have moral importance
elsewhere, but they are not relevant to this form of equality.
At the same time, political relational equality captures what is most harmful about
inequality. Samuel Scheﬄer suggests that we ﬁnd equality valuable “because we believe
that there is something valuable about human relationships that are, in certain crucial
[21]
respects at least, unstructured by diﬀerences in rank, power, or status.”
If every
citizen relates to one another as an equal citizen with an equal right to participate in
political deliberation (regardless of whether she exercise that right), then this
unstructured relationship will necessarily exist between every person in society, at least
in an important political sense. One account of human ﬂourishing takes living
collaboratively with others as necessary to reach one’s full potential. If humans are by
nature social and if we need to live free from stiﬂing relationships to fully engage
socially, then the kind of inequalities that prevent our forming unstructured
relationships also prevent our human ﬂourishing. Political institutions inﬂuence much
of our social interactions. Patterns of political privilege and deference therefore color
much of our personal relationships, too. Privilege and deference undermine the
self-respect of those in the inferior position and inﬂate the others’ sense of superiority in
a way that corrupts their mutual human relationships and prevents those in the inferior
position from recognizing and fulﬁlling their own full potential. A regime of equality
under which every citizen relates to each other as at least equally entitled to participate
in political deliberations creates a buﬀer against the harmful inequalities that
undermine self-respect and prevent ﬂourishing.
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A more interesting response to MacIntyre’s objection about the megalopsychos’ essential
incompatibility with a society of equals that is sensitive to the sketch of equality given
above argues that the objection only looks concerning because the terms “superior”,
“inferior”, and “equals” are left unspeciﬁed. Inequality, with its inherent relations of
inferiority and superiority, only becomes a problem when it undermines people’s
relational standings of political equality, that is, when it results in certain people being
excluded from political discussions because they are not entitled to participate and
others do not recognize a responsibility to listen respectfully. On the view that I am
considering, recognition that some people do while others do not possess megalopsychia
does not aﬀect individuals’ standing to participate in the deliberative process.
Superiority in goodness is not relevant to and therefore does not undermine one’s
ability to contribute to that process. And because it does not undermine one’s ability to
participate in the process, it should not aﬀect the how individuals are listened to in
democratic deliberations either.
As grounds for being excluded from political discussion, Anderson speciﬁes
[22]
“communicative incompetence” and unwillingness to participate respectfully.
There
is nothing essential to inequalities in virtue that means that they must lead to political
relational inequality. It is certainly a problem if less virtuous people happen to be
treated disrespectfully in political deliberations even though they are perfectly qualiﬁed
to participate – if their comparatively lesser virtue is used as a reason to discriminate
against them. But that would be the reﬂection of a greater problem in that society, not a
direct consequence of the existence of megalopsychia. Megalopsychia does not depend on
or in itself necessarily cause political disrespect.
However, it might still be a problem that the megalopsychos “is given to telling the truth,
except when he speaks in irony to the vulgar” (1124b30-31). Hiding the truth from
someone, even if telling the truth would be “as vulgar as a display of strength against
the weak” (1124b23) assumes that someone is not worthy of the truth. In a political
deliberation, withholding it from someone does not respect that person as capable of
dealing with the truth and thereby of fully participating in communal deliberation. The
excuse that the megalopsychos acts in this way to spare the feelings of the less virtuous
person is not enough to justify the action. In practice, the megalopsychos’ tendency to be
“unassuming towards those of the middle class” (1124b19) and not to call attention to
his superiority may partially oﬀset the eﬀects of his disrespect, but it cannot obviate it
completely. Even if possible disrespectful deception about the megalopsychos’ superiority
is an open issue, specifying the relevant kind of equality as political relational inequality
signiﬁcantly limits how much of a problem the existence of a megalopsychos can pose in
what would otherwise be a society of equals. It thus takes away much of the force of the
objection that the megalopsychos is essentially incompatible with a society of equals.
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III.
What we can learn from the megalopsychos
Megalopsychia is unique among Aristotle’s other virtues in not relating directly to how
people act. Unlike courage, temperance, and generosity, which are distinguished by
courageous, temperate, and generous acts performed from the corresponding
dispositions, megalopsychia is distinguished by possession of the other virtues to a great
degree. Aristotle likens megalopsychia to an ornament that decorates goodness but
cannot cause it, describing it as “a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes them greater
and is not found without them” (1124a1). The megalopsychos is good in the same kinds of
ways that people who possess other virtues are good, but he is diﬀerent in the extent of
his virtues and because he possesses so many at once. He is properly called great, not
simply good, because his goodness is on a scale large enough to distinguish it from
ordinary goodness. He is not concerned to “aim at the things commonly held in honor”
but instead acts in situations where “great work is at stake” (1124b24). The eﬀect of his
lofty aims is that he does things that ordinary people would not do – he may be a
visionary who undertakes projects so important and far-reaching that they have
resounding social beneﬁts or change a society’s trajectory. Curzer likens the
megalopsychos to a Homeric hero and suggests that they are uncommon enough for most
[23]
of us not to know any.
He is the kind of epic ﬁgure that should be admired, not
admonished, in his rare instantiations. The rarity of megalopsychia does not diminish its
importance in contemporary thought, however. Even those of us who are not ourselves
great can learn from the megalopsychos. In particular, we can strive to emulate his
motivation from the good and his self-understanding of particular goodness.
The part of megalopsychia that reaches for the good (through aiming at virtue) models a
view about coincident self-improvement through striving for the good that has fallen
out of fashion. For the megalopsychos, reaching for the good is a worthy individual
pursuit, not a way to display superiority over others. The fact that reaching for the good
is an individual pursuit initially comes oﬀ as uncomfortably self-absorbed in a world
where we are more used to following an ethics of duty that more explicitly refers to
other people. But the self-improvement that megalopsychia advocates is not actually
motivated by the self. It is motivated by the sake of the good, which exists beyond the
self. Just as honor may come as a coincident eﬀect of being good, the self coincidentally
will be improved through striving for the good. Acting as a megalopsychos will also
coincidentally beneﬁt other people: as a consequence of acting courageously or being a
better friend (both are ways of pursuing the good), one will end up performing many of
the same actions required by duties to other people. Megalopsychia gives us a model of
acting for the sake of the good that encourages us to reﬂect and understand what the
good is, rather than more simply acting within the set constraints of duty. It does result
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in self-improvement, but through a reorientation toward the sake of the good and away
from what is demanded by morality of every individual.
Thinking about megalopsychia as seeking the good also reminds us that being good and
seeking self-improvement need not be comparative or competitive. While megalopsychia
is a virtue, its absence is not a vice. Megalopsychia is good in that it “makes [the other
virtues] greater” (1125a25) and encourages worthy people to strive to meet their full
potential (1125a25-30). But the vain and the unduly humble (the respective vices of
over- and under-evaluation of greatness) who lack megalopsychia “are not thought to be
bad (for they are not evildoers) but only mistaken” (1125a18). Lacking megalopsychia is
not enough to mark one as a bad person. There is an asymmetry: while it is a positive
thing to possess more megalopsychia, it is not a deeply negative thing to possess less of it.
There is no threshold above which one is “good,” and below which one is “bad.”
Rather, embracing megalopsychia means embarking on a continual quest for
improvement through reaching closer to the good. This approach has the advantage
over more conventional ways of thinking about duties and obligations that by being less
prescriptive, it is less stressful and punitive and encourages people to never settle as
having completed their duties.
The megalopsychos’ self-understanding of his goodness oﬀers another important lesson
about setting appropriate aspirations. Being unduly humble, far from being a virtue,
actually makes a person worse. Aristotle asserts that “each class of people aims at what
corresponds to its worth,” (1125a25) (or at least what it thinks to be its worth). Someone
who does not recognize that he is worthy of good things sets inappropriately low goals
and thereby “robs himself of what he deserves” (1125a20). Conversely, vain people with
an inﬂated sense of self attempt inappropriately grand actions “and then are found out”
(1125a30). The megalopsychos, in contrast, accurately assesses his great worth and so sets
ambitious goals that he is able to meet. The megalopsychos teaches us to develop an
awareness of our own capabilities: set our aspirations too low and we will not meet our
full potential; but set out aspirations too high and we will be exposed as unworthy of
them. While not everyone can be a megalopsychos because not everyone is good in the
highest degree, everyone can nonetheless understand her own goodness and act in
accordance with it.
Despite Aristotle’s praise of them as “good in the highest degree” (1123b27),
megalopsychoi are not perfect. They are excessively concerned with their relationships to
others, which makes them “seem also to remember any service they have done, but not
those they have received (for he who receives a service is inferior to him who has done
it, and the proud man wishes to be superior)” (1124b13). Their peculiar forgetfulness
comes from being ashamed to admit inferiority to one’s benefactor and stands in the
way of complete self-knowledge. Unlike the megalopsychos, we should be appropriately
humble to recognize our own shortcomings and not allow concern with self-image to
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eclipse self-understanding. Although he has faults, such as hiding his goodness to those
he deems less good and allowing his shame partly to cloud his self-understanding, he is
not nearly as unappealing as objections that he is exempt from ordinary morality and
that he is essentially of a society of unequals might initially make him seem. But despite
his ﬂaws, he is uniquely able to perform grand-scale acts of goodness. That and his
devotion to the good for the sake of the good rather than for self-serving reasons, his
compatibility with a noncompetitive view of morality, and his highly developed if
imperfect self-understanding are enough to make him admirable in many respects. We
would be better oﬀ today if we embraced the positive lessons that we can learn from the
megalopsychos instead of rejecting everything about him because his superiority in virtue
initially makes us uncomfortable.
Notes
[1]

No word in English precisely describes the character Aristotle describes. Various authors have

suggested such “proud”, “magnanimous”, “great-hearted”, and “great-souled”, but I follow Curzer in
leaving the term untranslated rather than use a translation that carries irrelevant or inappropriate
connotations.
[2]
Line numbers refer to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics trans. David Ross (New York: Oxford University
Press 2009).
[3]

Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 79.

[4]

MacIntyre and Nancy Sherman, “Common Sense and Uncommon Virtue,” Midwest Studies in

Philosophy 13 (1998)
[5]
Sherman 103.

[6]

Howard Curzer, “Aristotle’s Much Maligned Megalopsychos,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69, no.

2 (1991): 134, 138, and 142
[7]
Sherman 105

[8]
[9]

Sherman 111
At 1124b4-6, in discussion of diﬀerences between the truly and only apparently megalopsychos

[10]
[11]

Etymology information primarily from Wiktionary and other online Greek dictionaries.
Michael Pakaluk, “The Meaning of Aristotelian Magnanimity,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy

36, ed. David Sedley (2004): 251.
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Christian Rowe, quoted in Pakaluk 264
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1124b10
Pakaluk 270-271
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Curzer 132
Although if it were, it would follow that the extent to which megalopsychia is important for social

relationships depends in part on how important it is to have great things. I could probably take a diﬀerent
approach, focusing on external goods, and still conclude that the megalopsychos can live in a society of
equals so long as material goods do not inﬂuence people’s standing in relations of equality to each other.
[18]
MacIntyre 78

[19]
[20]

Elizabeth Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109, no. 2 (1992): 313.
Everyone is entitled to be listened to respectfully at least until they prove themselves incapable of

participating. Nobody can be ruled incapable without ﬁrst being given a fair hearing.
[21]
Samuel Scheﬄer, “Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics
4, no. 1 (2005): 17
[22]
Anderson 313

[23]

Curzer 150
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